Security by Wandering Around

 :: Posted by Michael A. Silva on 02-09-2012

Origination and Concept

In the 1970′s, the Hewlett Packard company popularized a style of management known as “Management by Wandering Around” (MBWA). MBWA was made famous in the 1982 management book “In Search of Excellence” written by Tom Peters and Bob Waterman.

The basic theory behind MBWA is that managers, rather than staying in their offices and reading reports, should walk the floors of their company to observe what is actually going on. These walks should be done randomly and unannounced so that the manager sees actual conditions rather than something staged by employees in anticipation of the manager’s visit. By making these visits on a random basis, the manager can gain a realistic picture of what is really happening at the company.

Security by Wandering Around

We highly recommend that security managers (or other managers in charge of security) institute a similar practice, something we call “Security by Wandering Around” (SBWA). This practice involves the security manager making frequent, unannounced inspections of the facilities that they manage, both during the work day, and at night and on weekends.

Here are some ideas for things that should be looked at when making SBWA inspections:

  • If your company has a employee identification badge wearing policy, are all employees properly displaying their badges? Are non-employees wearing visitor badges? Are unidentified people walking through the building?
  • Are doors and file cabinets that are supposed to kept locked actually kept locked?
  • Take a look at unattended employee desks and workstations to see what’s lying on the desk. Unsecured confidential information? Unsecured laptops? Unsecured personal property (purses, wallets, etc.) Are passwords written on sticky notes attached to a keyboard or monitor? Are keys or access cards lying on the desk?
  • Take a look in office trash containers. Have sensitive documents been placed in the trash instead of being shredded or placed in shred bins?
  • Have sensitive documents been left lying in copy machines or printer?
  • If a commercial shredding service is used, are shred bins overflowing?  Can documents easily be pulled or “fished” out of the slot in the bin?
  • Observe what goes on at the reception or security desk in your building lobby. Are proper visitor sign-in procedures being followed?  Are certain people passing by the desk without stopping or being observed? Are unauthorized deliveries being received at the desk? Do the people staffing the desk appear to have too much or too little to do?
  • Observe your shipping/receiving loading docks. Are dock doors being left open when they are unattended? Has high-value merchandise been left unattended on the docks? Are vendors or employees using the dock as an unauthorized building entrance or exit point?
  • Observe employee entrance doors. Are employees individually using their access cards to enter the building, or are employees holding the door open for others? Are employees propping open the doors?
  • Inspect stairways and emergency exit doors. Are stairways being improperly used for storage? Are emergency exit doors blocked or obstructed?
  • Walk the entire perimeter of your buildings. Are all exterior doors, windows and hatches properly closed and latched? When opened, do doors close and latch on their own, or do they need to be pulled shut?
  • Take a look through the exterior windows on the ground level of your building. Do you see confidential or proprietary information openly displayed or written on whiteboards? What could a competitor learn by looking through your windows?
  • Take a look at your landscaping. Is it overgrown in some places? Does its obstruct lights or security cameras? Does it obscure windows or prevent direct visual observation of parking lots and walkways? Does landscaping provide convenient hiding places for criminals?
  • Walk the entire perimeter of your site. Is fencing loose or broken in any areas? Are materials stacked too close to the fence? Does it appear that there are unauthorized points of entry to your property? Are security signs properly placed and clearly visible? How is the overall housekeeping of the site?
  • Check exterior trash and recycle containers. Do they contain confidential documents that should have been shredded? Are trash containers that are supposed to be kept locked actually kept locked?
  • During the night, check the lights in the parking lots, along the walkways, and at the exterior of the building. Are there burned out lights? Are light fixtures in need of cleaning?
  • If you use security officers, observe their activities at various times throughout their shift without them being aware of your presence. Are officers properly attired? Are they making patrols at the assigned times? Are they following proper patrol procedures? Do they appear to be observant while making patrols, or are they just going through the motions? Do officers appear to be spending time on personal activities (phone calls, texting, school homework, etc.) rather than doing their jobs?

SBWA inspections should not be confused with formal security assessments or surveys: the SBWA process should be informal and free-flowing. The goal is to get an overall sense of what is going on at the facility, not to mark-off specific items on a form or checklist.

SBWA inspections should be conducted at least monthly. If you have never done this type of inspection before, prepare to be shocked. Avoid the temptation to place blame or to immediately start fixing problems that you have found. Instead, make notes of what you have observed. Then, after taking time to reflect on the data, put together a long-term plan for correcting the deficiencies that you have identified.

No Comments » | Sec Management

Establishing Written Policies for the Use of Video Surveillance Systems

 :: Posted by Michael A. Silva on 01-12-2012

Purpose

The installation of a video surveillance system at your facility can provide many benefits, but can also be the source of numerous problems that you might not have the thought of when you first installed the system. Many facility managers are blindsided when an employee requests to see a video from a parking lot camera to determine who may have backed into her car; or when a supervisor requests video to track the work habits of an employee. Requests for recorded video are also often made by neighboring businesses and members of the general public. How should the manager of the video system handle these requests?

Employees and tenants can also have unrealistic expectations of what the video surveillance system can do, often thinking that the single camera that views the parking lot will provide a close-up view of a person breaking into their car, even though it is located 300′ away. If the recorded video doesn’t provide enough detail, they request that the image be “enhanced and enlarged” so they can identify the “perp”. (It works that way on the CSI and NCIS shows on television, right?)

To effectively manage these issues, every organization that uses a video surveillance system should establish written policies regarding its purpose and use. These policies should be known by everyone in the organization so that expectations are realistic and so that there are no surprises after an incident has occurred. These written policies provide guidelines to the manager of the video surveillance system telling exactly how each specific type of situation should be handled.

Your organization should develop a video surveillance system policy that is specifically tailored to meet your needs. At a minimum, your video surveillance policy should address the following topics:

  • Purpose of video surveillance system.
  • Where cameras are typically used.
  • Where cameras are generally never used.
  • Where video surveillance system is monitored.
  • How video is recorded and for what duration.
  • Who is responsible for the management of the video surveillance system.
  • Who has access to video recordings and for what purposes.
  • The use of covert cameras.
  • Procedures for requesting video recordings.
  • Archival storage of video recordings related to security incidents.

Because your video surveillance system policy may have legal implications, the policy should be reviewed by your in-house counsel or an outside attorney before it is finalized.

Example of Video Surveillance System Policy

The following is a example of a video surveillance policy for a medium-sized organization. This policy is intended to provoke thoughts that can be used in developing your own policies. It is not intended to be used as a template or to be used without modification.

 

 

Video Surveillance System Policies for the Acme Corporation
Version 1.0   01/10/12

Purpose

The Acme Corporation makes limited use of video surveillance systems on its corporate campus. Video surveillance systems are primarily used to record access at building entrances and at the garage elevator lobbies. Video surveillance cameras are also used to provide surveillance of the exterior of the building and surrounding streets.

Video surveillance cameras are generally not used to observe employee work areas, and are never used in areas where employees would have an expectation of privacy, such as restrooms or locker rooms.

The primary purpose of the video surveillance system is to allow the after-the-fact investigation of crimes committed against the company. The system may also be used to assist in the investigation of certain types of occupational health and safety violations.

The video surveillance system is not intended to be used as a method of tracking the work habits or productivity of individual employees.

Management of Video Surveillance Systems

The Acme Corporation Security Department is responsible for the management of all video surveillance systems used at the corporation. Other corporate departments shall not install video surveillance system without the knowledge and approval of the Security Department. In particular, the use of covert camera systems must first be approved by both the Acme Corporation Security Department and Legal Department.

Video Surveillance Monitoring

The video surveillance systems are capable of being monitored from the Security Desk located at the Omega Building lobby. Security officers generally view video surveillance cameras on a periodic basis or in response to a specific incident. Because of the many responsibilities of the officer at the Security Desk, the video surveillance system is not monitored on a continuous basis.

Video Surveillance Recording

All video surveillance cameras are capable of being recorded continuously by a digital video recording system. Recorded video is used exclusively for the investigation of security and safety incidents and not for other purposes.

The Acme Corporation Security Department is responsible for the management of the video surveillance system and has exclusive control of the release of video recordings produced by this system.

Recorded video is not made directly available to Acme Corporation employees, building tenants, or the general public. In the event that a security incident occurs, employees should report the incident to the Security Manager. If the event occurred in an area where video surveillance coverage is available, the Security Manager will review the recorded video and make a determination if any video relevant to the incident is available. This video will be used by the Security Manager to investigate and resolve the reported security incident.

Requests to provide video recordings directly to non-employees (such as tenants, neighbors, or members of the general public) will not be accommodated. If a crime has been committed, non-employees should be encouraged to report it to the police. If it is believed that recorded video from the Acme Corporation would assist in the investigation of this crime, the police should be told to contact the Acme Corporation Security Manager. If relevant video is available, a permanent video clip of the incident will be produced and made available to the police. All requests for video recordings by law enforcement agencies shall be coordinated through the Acme Corporation Legal Department.

Recorded video is generally stored for a period of thirty days. Any video associated with a specific security incident or event is generally converted into a permanent video clip and stored for the duration of the investigation. Video clips which could become evidence in civil or criminal proceedings are kept indefinitely unless other direction is given by the Legal Department.

Limitations of Video Surveillance Systems

Employees should be aware that a security officer is not watching most cameras most of the time and employees should not have an expectation that they are under continuous surveillance when they are in the range of a camera. For example, employees walking to their car late at night should call Security and request an escort rather than assume that they are already being watched by a security officer using a camera.

Employees should also be aware that the video surveillance system has cameras that cover only a small fraction of the total campus, and even when camera coverage exists, it may not provide the level of detail necessary to spot suspicious activity or identify criminals.

No Comments » | Sec Procedures, Uncategorized, Video Cameras

Cell Phones or Two-Way Radios for Security Communications?

 :: Posted by Michael A. Silva on 11-28-2011

The Need for Security Communications

Many organizations use security officers as a part of their overall security program. These officers make routine patrols, respond to security incidents, and provide other services to employees and to the general public. For security officers to work effectively, it is essential that they have a good communications system in place. This system needs to allow security officers to be summoned when their help is needed, as well as allow communications between security officers as they carry out their daily activities.

In larger organizations, there is typically some form of central security command center that serves as the hub of the security operation. In these cases, calls for security service are typically made to the command center, which in turn dispatches a security officer to the location where needed. For example, if an employee sees someone suspicious in the parking lot, she would call the number of the security command center to report the incident. The command center would then dispatch one or more security officers to the parking lot to investigate. The command center would monitor the incident, coordinate activities between security officers, and if needed, call in outside agencies for help.

Smaller organizations may not have a security command center and may only have one security officer on site at any one time. In these cases, employees usually communicate directly with the security officer who is on duty. For example. if an employee was locked out of his office and needed access, he would contact the security officer on duty and ask him to respond to unlock the door.

Communications Options

The two most common methods of security communications used today are the cell phone and the two-way radio. In the past, pagers were also commonly used but have now been mostly replaced by cell phones.

Security managers often have difficulty in deciding which communications devices should be issued to security officers: should they issue cell phones, two-way radios, or both? Within this article, we will discuss the advantages and disadvantages of both options and provide some ideas that may be helpful when planning your security communications system.

Two-Way Radios

Two-way radio systems have been used for business, public safety, and security communications for more than fifty years. Prior to the introduction of cell phones, two-way radios were really the only option when you wanted two-way communications with someone on the go.

Two-way radios consist of two parts, a radio transmitter, and a radio receiver. These two parts are combined into a single unit known as a radio “transceiver”. There are three types of radio transceivers: portable transceivers, mobile transceivers, and base station transceivers. The following is a brief description of each transceiver type:

Portable Transceivers

Portable transceivers, often called “walkie-talkies”, are hand-held units that can easily be carried by the security officer. These units are battery powered and have a self-contained speaker, microphone, and antenna. External microphones and earphones can also be used.

Portable transceivers typically have a range of between one and three miles depending on power, frequency, and the type of obstructions between units. Range within concrete or steel buildings can be considerably less.

Mobile Transceivers

Mobile transceivers are larger units that are designed to be mounted in vehicles. Mobile transceivers have an external microphone that makes using the radio while driving more convenient. Mobile transceivers are powered from the the vehicle’s electrical system and typically transmit at a much higher power than that used by portable transceivers. Mobile transceivers also have an external antenna that is usually mounted on the roof or trunk of the vehicle. The combination of a higher transmitting power and an external antenna gives mobile transceivers a much greater range than portable transceivers; typically five to fifteen miles depending on conditions.

Base Station Transceivers

Base station transceivers are designed to be mounted at a fixed location, such as at the security command center. Base station transceivers typically operate at high power levels and use an external antenna mounted on the roof of the building. Base station transceivers can be provided with desktop microphones and speakers that can allow use of the radio from multiple locations in the security command center.

The typical security department would probably use a combination of transceiver types; portable transceivers would be carried by security officers, mobile transceivers would be used in security patrol vehicles, and a base station transceiver would be used at the security command center.

Two-way radio systems are available in several different frequency ranges. VHF high band (130 -174 MHz) and UHF (400 – 512 MHz) are the frequencies most commonly used for security purposes. Most security organizations use conventional analog two-way radio systems, although some very large organizations may use digital or trunked radio systems.

Many campuses are so large that they exceed the limited range of a portable two-way radio transceiver. To solve this problem, radio repeaters are often used. Radio repeaters are mounted at a high-point on the campus (such as at the top of a building or water tower) and extend the range of signals by receiving and retransmitting them. A repeater mounted in a very high place (such as on a mountaintop or high-rise building) can often allow portable transceivers to cover an entire city or county.

Some buildings are so densely constructed that they block out radio signals, preventing communications through more than one or two floors. To solve this problem, distributed antenna systems can be used within the building to pickup and and distribute signals between floors. These systems often use “leaky coax” type antennas installed above the ceilings.

Many large organizations may need to use a combination of both radio repeaters and distributed antenna systems to provide reliable two-way radio system coverage throughout their entire campus.

Cell Phones

Cellular telephones (“cell phones”) were first introduced about twenty-five years ago. Early cell phones were bulky and expensive and only worked in limited areas. Today, cell phones are small, convenient, relatively inexpensive and used by almost everyone from small children to senior citizens. Many of today’s cell phones are “smartphones” that in addition to being used to make calls, can be used for email, text messaging, web browsing, listening to music and running application programs.

Unknown to many people, cell phones are actually a form of radio transceiver, This transceiver transmits and receives low-power radio signals to and from nearby radio stations known as “cell sites”. These cell sites each cover a small geographic area and communicate with all of a given service provider’s cell phones within that area. In suburban areas, each cell site may cover an area of several miles, while in dense urban areas, each cell site may cover an area of a quarter-mile or less.

All cell sites are connected to a central computer which manages communications between the cell phones and the sites. As a user travels down the road using his cell phone, the computer keeps track of the phone’s location and automatically switches the cell phone to the nearest site. The computer can also adjust the phone’s transmitting power so that an appropriate level of power is always used. When someone dials a cell phone number, the central computer routes the call to the the cell site nearest to where the cell phone is located and rings the phone.

Good cell phone coverage is now available in most metropolitan areas of the United States. Chances are very good that your cell phone will work almost everywhere in the outdoor areas on your campus. Indoor coverage is another matter. While cell phones usually work well in wood frame buildings, coverage can be spotty in concrete or steel frame buildings, except when standing near outside walls. Cell phone coverage in below-grade basements or underground parking garages can also be a problem.

To provide good cell phone coverage within all areas of large buildings, it is sometimes necessary to install distributed antenna systems similar to those used with two-way radio systems. These systems are usually custom engineered to meet the specific needs of the building. The cost of installing these systems is sometimes subsidized by the cell phone carrier if the organization is a significant customer.

Comparison Between Two-Way Radios and Cell Phones

Two-way radios and cell phones each have their advantages and disadvantages. Here is a brief comparison of each option:

Two-Way Radios

ADVANTAGES

  • Simple and easy to use.
  • Rugged and reliable – suitable for use in outdoor and heavy industrial environments.
  • Loud audio output – suitable for use in noisy areas.
  • Available with many accessories designed specifically for security use.
  • Allows “one-to-many” communications – all officers can hear all communications. Very beneficial when many officers are involved in responding to the same security incident. Also provides officers with overall awareness of what is happening on the campus.
  • System is completely owned and operated by the organization.
  • System can continue to work during times of crisis (earthquake, tornado, etc.) that may overwhelm public cell phone network.
  • Less opportunity for misuse by security officers.
  • No ongoing fees for cell phone service or airtime.

DISADVANTAGES

  • Requires initial capital investment for radios, licensing and installation.
  • Must install and maintain own infrastructure (antennas, repeaters, emergency power, etc.)
  • Limited coverage – only works in designated areas. Generally can’t be used away from campus.
  • No ability to make or receive telephone calls (a).
  • No ability to use for text messaging, email, or web browsing.
  • No ability to use with security monitoring applications (guard tour, remote video viewing, etc.).
  • Easy for outside parties to eavesdrop on security communications using radio scanner (b).

Cell Phones

ADVANTAGES

  • Little or no initial capital investment (with 2 year service committment)
  • No need to install and maintain infrastructure  (antennas, repeaters, emergency power, etc.)
  • Wide coverage – works anywhere cell service is available.
  • Ability to make or receive calls to and from any telephone.
  • Ability to use for text messaging, email, or web browsing.
  • Ability to use with security monitoring applications (guard tour, remote video viewing, etc.).
  • Difficult for outside parties to eavesdrop on security communications using radio scanner.

DISADVANTAGES

  • More complicated to use.
  • Generally less rugged and reliable than radio units. May not last long  in outdoor or heavy industrial environments.
  • May be difficult to use in noisy areas.
  • Few accessories designed specifically for security use are available.
  • Higher potential for misuse by security officers. Officers may make personal calls, text, or participate in social media activity while on duty.
  • Only allows “one-to-one” communications (c)  – security officers can’t hear communications between other officers. Awkward when multiple officers are involved in responding to the same security incident. Deprives officers of overall awareness of what is happening on the campus.
  • Reliant on outside party (cell phone service provider) for operation of the system.
  • Public cell phone network can be overwhelmed during times of crisis (earthquake, tornado, etc.). Service may not be available at times when it is needed most.
  • Ongoing fees for cellular service and airtime.

Our Conclusions and Recommendations

It is our opinion that the simplicity, ruggedness, and reliability of two-way radios makes them the best choice for security officer communications in most situations. Just as law enforcement and other public service agencies continue to use two-way radios, we feel that most security departments are still best served by using two-way radios over other communications devices.

The only exception is very small organizations where there may only be one security officer on duty at a time. In these cases, a cell phone is probably the only communications option that makes sense.

Tips for Using Radios and Cell Phones

  1. In general, security officers should carry only a single type of communications device while on duty. If officers are issued two-way radios, the carrying of cell phones (including personal cell phones) by officers should not be allowed. An exception can be made for supervisory officers who may occasionally have a legitimate need to use a cell phone. A formal policy concerning the use of cell phones while on duty should be written and enforced.
  2. All communications devices used by the security officer while on duty should be provided by the organization and not by the individual employee or contract security provider.
  3. All communications to and from security officers in the field should be routed through the security command center. It is important that the command center know what security officers are up to at all times. Arrangements where employees directly contact security officers without going through the command center should be discouraged.
  4. A system should be established so that all security officers in the field check in with the security command center at regular intervals, such as every hour. At small facilities with only a single security officer, arrangements should be made with an outside service to check on the status of the officer on a 24/7 basis. This can be the dispatch center of a contract security company, or an alarm monitoring company or answering service.
  5. Commercial grade two-way radios on a licensed business frequency should be used for security purposes. The inexpensive Family Radio Service (FRS) radios sold in retail outlets are not suitable for professional use and are subject to interference from outside users. The price of high-quality, professional grade radios will prove to be money well spent over the long run.
  6. In larger organizations, it may be beneficial for the security department to share a radio channel with other building services departments, such as facilities management, maintenance and janitorial services. There are advantages to having all team members on the same channel, especially during times of emergency. Employees of other departments can also act as informal “eyes and ears” for security and quickly report suspicious activity to the security command center. That being said, there are some times when conversations between security officers should not be heard by those outside the department. To accommodate this, we suggest that two-channel radios be used; one channel that is shared by all departments and used for routine purposes, and a second channel that can be used exclusively by the security department at times when this is needed.
  7. There have been many recent security and surveillance applications developed for use on smartphones. These include video viewing and remote alarm monitoring applications. Sellers of these applications claim that they can allow a security officer to monitor and control the facility’s security systems while on patrol. While there may be some uses for these applications, we feel that they are more of a novelty than a useful tool. We feel that the monitoring of security systems and the making of security patrols are two distinctly different functions, and that an officer trying to do both at the same time will do neither particularly well. Trying to monitor security systems while on patrol can be a major distraction and may place the roving security officer at risk.

Footnotes

(a)It is possible to make and receive telephone calls with a two-way radio if a telephone interconnection unit is provided at the radio base station. While these units were widely-used prior to the introduction of cell phones, they are rarely used today.

(b)It is possible to provide two-way radios that have an encrypted signal that cannot be easily listened to with a radio scanner. Radios that have this feature are more expensive and not commonly used in most security communications applications.

(c)Some cell phone providers offer a service that they claim provides “one-to-many” functionality. An example of one such service is Sprint/Nextel’s Direct Connect. It is our opinion that these services have many limitations and do not fully replicate the “one-to-many” capability provided by a two-way radio system.

No Comments » | Security Guards

Why Would an Experienced Security Manager Hire a Security Consultant?

 :: Posted by Michael A. Silva on 10-26-2011

Most security and loss prevention managers are very qualified to perform their jobs. Many have had years of previous experience in law enforcement or the military and consider themselves to be experts in security matters. These security managers are often reluctant to bring in an outside security consultant, often stating the following reasons:

 ”No one is more familiar with my company’s security needs than I am – there is no way an outside consultant could tell me anything that I don’t already know”

“I am supposed to be the company’s security expert. Won’t my boss think I’m incompetent if I ask to bring in outside help?”

“Consultants are expensive – there is no way we could afford to hire one, not on our security budget”

“Working on this project (security design, policy manual, training program, etc.) will be enjoyable and a nice break from my normal routine. Who cares if I’ve never done anything like this before – I’ll learn as I go along. Bringing in an outside consultant would spoil my fun…” 

The security manager’s reluctance to use outside help is interesting given that most practitioners in every other profession regularly use consultants to provide specialized expertise or to render an outside opinion. For example, medical doctors almost always bring in other professionals such as radiologists, hematologists, and other specialists when a patient’s condition warrants it, and wouldn’t dream of trying to do everything themselves. Similarly, top-rated attorneys almost always bring in other attorneys with specialized expertise when bringing complicated legal cases to trial.

Smart security managers should recognize that they cannot be an expert on everything, and that bringing in outside help is a sign of strength, not weakness. The benefits provided by an outside security consultant can include:

  • The consultant has the ability to provide a fresh, unbiased opinion. Sometimes the security manager can be too close to a situation to see it clearly.
  • The consultant has experience with similar security problems and conditions at many other companies and organizations. Most problems are not unique and others have figured out answers to them before. A good consultant is familiar with solutions that have worked at other facilities and can immediately transfer this knowledge to you.
  • The consultant has up-to-date knowledge of security best practices and the latest security technology.
  • The consultant has no need to temper his opinions for political reasons— he can “tell it like it is” without fear of retribution. Many security managers are afraid to bring up important issues within their organization because they are afraid of stepping on toes or making enemies.
  • The consultant has the ability to work full-time on your project and does not have to juggle the multitude of daily responsibilities that the security manager has.
  • The consultant has experience in conducting formal consulting assignments, writing reports, and making presentations. Many security managers have great security knowledge but are not expert writers or presenters.
  • The consultant has done similar projects many times before and can do the job more quickly and efficiently than the security manager can. For example, a security manager may have been called upon to write a policy manual maybe once or twice in his career, where a good consultant has probably written similar manuals dozens or even hundreds of times before.
  • A consultant can bring in technical expertise that the security manager doesn’t have. Things such as designing security for a new facility, developing a workplace violence program, or preparing an RFP for a new video surveillance system are often best done with the help of a consultant who is an expert in these areas.
  • An outside consultant can often have more credibility with your senior management team and can often sell ideas that the security manager alone cannot. Rightly or wrongly, a consultant and security manager can present the same idea, but senior management will accept it when presented by the consultant – while they would reject it if it was presented by the security manager.
  • A consultant can often save the organization time and money by doing things more efficiently, avoiding costly mistakes, and preventing the purchase of unnecessary equipment or services.

No Comments » | Sec Management

Solving the False “Door-Forced-Open” Alarm Problem

 :: Posted by Michael A. Silva on 09-29-2011

Purpose of Door Alarm Monitoring

Most businesses and organizations use some form of card access control system to control entry into their buildings and other facilities. These systems allow authorized employees to conveniently enter through secured doors without needing to use a key.

In addition to controlling access, most card access control systems also provide a door alarm monitoring feature. The purpose of door alarm monitoring is to detect improper use of the card access controlled door. Two types of door monitoring are commonly provided:

“Door-Forced-Open” Monitoring

In the event that any card reader door is opened from outside without the use of a valid access card, the system will cause a “Door-Forced-Open” (DFO) condition to occur.  For example, if an intruder were to pry the door open from the outside, this would cause a DFO condition to occur.

“Door-Open-Too-Long” Monitoring

In the event that any card reader door is propped or held open, the system will cause a “Door-Open-Too-Long” (OTL) condition to occur. For example, if an employee were to wedge a door open, this would cause a OTL condition to occur.

In most cases, the access control system is designed so that a security monitoring center is notified whenever a DFO or OTL condition occurs, allowing an appropriate security response to be made. In some cases this may involve dispatching a security officer to the door to investigate; in other cases, an employee working near the door may be called and asked to see what is going on at the door. If the facility has a video surveillance system, the monitoring center may also use a video camera to observe activity at the door.

The door alarm monitoring feature is a necessary part of any automated security system. It makes no sense to install an expensive card access control system if doors can be opened without using an access card, or if people can walk in freely through doors that have been propped open. When working correctly, the door monitoring feature greatly improves security and provides assurance that all doors are being used as intended.  

The Problem

Unfortunately, the door alarm monitoring feature is a major source of of grief at many facilities. The problem: false DFO alarms. In most cases, these false alarms occur even though employees have done nothing wrong; they simply used the access controlled door in normal manner, yet the system triggered a false DFO alarm. In larger facilities, this can occur hundreds or even thousands of times per day. These alarms can flood the security monitoring center, overwhelming the monitoring staff.

Eventually, monitoring staff may become complacent about DFO alarms, or choose to ignore them completely. At some facilities, false DFO alarms can be such a problem that management becomes frustrated, and chooses to permanently disable the door alarm monitoring feature. Neither of these responses is appropriate as they decrease the overall level of security at the facility and turn the access control system into just an electronic locking system.

Is There a Solution?

Many end-users (and even security systems integrators) have come to accept the false DFO problem as
unsolvable. These people have given up on trying to find a solution and consider false DFO alarms to be a fact of life when using a access control system.

Is there a solution?  Yes!  While false DFO alarms can never be entirely eliminated, Silva Consultants believes that they can be reduced by 95% or more through effective system design.

At facilities that already have systems installed, modifications can be made to existing equipment that will eliminate most false DFO alarms. Fixing false DFO problems on existing systems requires work, but can be done with some knowledge of basic design principles and a little patience.

How Door Monitoring Works

Before discussing specific solutions to the false DFO problem, it is helpful to understand how the door monitoring feature works on the typical access control system.

The typical access controlled door has the following devices:

  • Card reader on outside (non-secured) side of door. Common types of card readers include proximity readers, smartcard readers, and magnetic stripe readers.
  • Request-to-exit (REX) device on inside (secured) side of door. Common types of REX devices include REX motion detectors, REX switches in lock hardware, and manual REX buttons.
  • Electric lock hardware. Common types of electric lock hardware include electric strikes, electric locks, and electromagnetic locks.
  • Door position switch. The most common type of door position switch is the magnetic contact switch.

All of the devices at the door are connected to the access control system, usually through some type of intelligent control panel which may be located at the door, or in a nearby electrical closet.

Here is how the access control system door monitoring feature works:

Entering through the door from the outside:

When a user presents his or her card at the card reader, the reader sends a signal to the access control system. If the card is valid, the access control systems sends a signal back to the electric lock hardware, causing the door to unlock. As the user opens the door, the door position switch sends a signal to the access control system, but because a valid card has just been used at the reader, the access control system does not cause a DFO alarm to occur.

Exiting through the door from the inside:

When a user approaches the door to exit, he or she activates the REX device. In the case of a REX motion detector, this occurs when the user steps into the detector’s coverage area. In the case of a REX switch inside of hardware, this occurs when the user turns the door handle or presses the exit bar. When using a manual REX button, this occurs when the user presses the button to leave.  As the user opens the door, the door position switch sends a signal to the access control system, but because a REX device was just activated, the access control system does not cause a DFO alarm to occur.

If an access controlled door is opened without either the use of a valid access card or the activation of a REX device, a door-forced-open (DFO) alarm will occur. This occurs because the access control system has received a signal from the door position switch telling it that the door has been opened, and without having received a previous signal from either the card reader or REX device, it assumes that the door is being forced open.

So, in summary, if a door is opened without using either the card reader or activating a REX device, a DFO alarm will occur.

Common Causes of False DFO Alarms

The following are some common causes of false DFO alarms:

Improper REX Motion Detector Coverage

REX motion detectors need to detect people just as they are ready to open the door. Too often, REX motion detectors are placed where they detect people approaching the door rather than at the door itself. This is sometimes done with good intentions (“I will detect them long before they get to the door”) but can create a “blind spot” in front of the door itself. (See Figure #1 below).

Users can pass through the detector’s coverage area and pause before opening the door, often long enough to allow the REX detector to reset. The user then opens the door, causing a DFO alarm to occur.

The solution: Carefully test each REX motion detector to determine its coverage area. Ideally, motion detectors should be pointed at the door knob or handle and provide detection before a person can open the door (See Figure #2 below). Relocate and/or readjust detector to provide positive coverage at the door and to avoid unwanted coverage elsewhere.

Improper REX Motion Detector Settings

Different brands of access control systems process door position switch and REX device inputs differently. Some systems require that the REX input signal be reset after each opening and closing of the door. Often, the time delay settings on REX motion detectors are set for too long a period. This allows the door to be closed and then reopened again before the detector has had a chance to reset. This causes a DFO alarm to occur when the door is opened the second time.

The solution: Learn specifically how your access control system processes door position switch and REX input signals. Adjust the settings on your REX detectors so that they provide a signal of an appropriate duration. On many systems, the REX detector should be adjusted to reset as quickly as possible after each activation, so that the system receives a series of pulses rather than a continuous activation.

Improper Lock Hardware Function

When a door is controlled by an access control system, the lock hardware on that door should not allow it to be left in the unlocked position manually. Lock hardware that allows this can be be a source of DFO alarms when users open the door manually from the outside without using their access card.

The solution: Examine all doors and replace any lock hardware that allows a door to be left in a manually unlocked state. If a door must be left open during certain times of the day, this should be done through programming of the access control system – not by manual operation of the lock. 

Door Doesn’t Latch Properly

Doors that don’t close and latch properly are a major source of DFO alarms. These occur when a user is able to pull a door open from the outside without using a card, or when a gust of wind blows the door open. Failure of a door to properly close and latch can be caused by many things, including defective doors and frames, defective door lock hardware, defective door closer, improper HVAC system air balancing, and obstructions at the doorway.

The solution: Carefully inspect all doors to make sure that they close and lock perfectly. Doors that must be “given a shove” to close won’t work well with a card access control system. Identify sources of problems and take corrective action. Check doors at various times throughout the day and year as certain problems (such as air balancing issues) may only happen at certain times.

Users are Using Brass Key Instead of Access Card

Most access controlled doors are equipped with lock cylinders that allow the door to be opened using a key in the event that the access control system fails. This works fine if keys are used strictly during emergencies, but causes chronic DFO alarms if users routinely use their key rather than a card to open the door. This not only creates false alarms, but also defeats the accountability provided by the access control systems audit trail feature.

The solution: Brass keys should be used on card reader controlled doors only in the event of an emergency. All lock cylinders on card reader controlled doors should be keyed to a special “emergency key” that is not routinely carried by employees, but instead handed out only during emergencies. If necessary, a break-glass box containing emergency keys can be providing in an area where it is accessible by authorized employees during a true emergency. The emergency key should not be part of the facilities master key system.

Users Forget to Use Manual REX Button

At facilities which use manual REX buttons, users sometimes forget to press the button on their way out, causing a DFO alarm.

The solution: Manual REX buttons are counterintuitive and not very user-friendly. In our opinion, they should only be used as a last resort or as a backup to another REX device. Consider replacing existing manual REX buttons with REX motion detectors or REX switches in the door lock hardware.

Users are Taping or Jamming the Latch Open

Users of the door sometimes tape or otherwise jam open the door latch so they can re-enter the door without using an access card. In some cases, this is because the person needs to go in and out of the door frequently and doesn’t want to have to use their access card each time. In other cases, the person has gained access to the inside of the door but doesn’t have a card (or access privileges) that would allow them to re-enter. Each time the door is opened from the outside without the use of a card, it causes a DFO alarm to occur.

 The solution: Provide ongoing security awareness training to all users of the system. Make sure that users have been assigned appropriate access privileges so that they can do their jobs. If doors must be left unlocked during certain times of the day, educate users on the right way of doing this (through programming of the access control system) versus the wrong way of doing this (taping the latch open). If necessary, provide signage at each door that reminds users of the proper procedures. Take disciplinary action against users who continue to violate policies despite repeated warnings. 

Door Not Interfaced with Automatic Door Opener

When a card reader door is also equipped with an automatic door opener, there is a potential for DFO alarms to occur when the opener opens the door before a REX device is activated. There are two ways in which this can occur:

  • The inside door opener actuator button is located beyond the range of the REX motion detector at the door. When the user presses the actuator button, it opens the door, but since the user has not yet activated the REX detector, it causes a DFO alarm. (See Figure #3 below)

 

  • The door opener’s motion detector has a greater range than the REX motion detector. When a user approaches the door, he activates the door opener’s detector prior to activating the REX detector, causing a DFO alarm. (See Figure #4 below)

 

The solution: Provide an interface between automatic door opener devices and the access control system. Outputs from door opener actuator buttons and door opener motion detectors should be connected as REX inputs to the access control system. This can be done by using devices that have double-pole switch contacts (one pole for the opener and one pole for the access control system), or by providing an external relay that provides double-pole contacts.

Tips for Solving False DFO Alarm Problems

  1. Troubleshooting of DFO alarms should be done carefully and methodically. At most facilities, you will find that 20% of your doors will be responsible for 80% of your DFO alarms. Run a report that shows all DFO alarms for a 24 hour period to identify those doors with the most problems. Begin attacking the problem by fixing the doors with the most false alarms first, then move on to the other doors.
  2. The most reliable type of REX device is a REX switch built into the lock hardware. This switch provides a positive indication when someone is exiting and is the least prone to problems. When installing hardware on a new door, this should be your first choice when the option is available. Also consider retrofitting existing hardware with REX switches, especially at doors that have been particularly troublesome in terms of false alarms.
  3. Sometimes, more than one REX device will be required at a door. For example, obstructions may prevent a single REX detector from detecting people approaching the door from different directions. Adding a second REX detector may be able to solve this.
  4. If you are pulling your hair out trying to solve false alarm problems at a particular door, consider temporarily installing a camera and video recorder specifically for the purposes of troubleshooting. This camera should be pointed at the inside of the door and allow you to observe activity coming and going. For improved diagnostics, provide indicator lights visible by the camera connected to the door position switch and REX device. These lights should illuminate when each device is activated, allowing you to observe the sequence of events as people pass through the door.

 

No Comments » | Access Control

Introduction to Panic Alarms

 :: Posted by Michael A. Silva on 09-13-2011

Purpose

The purpose of a panic alarm is to allow a person under duress to quickly and silently call for help in the event of an emergency. Panic alarms are also called “duress alarms”, “hold-up alarms”, or “panic buttons”.

Panic alarms are used when it may be unsafe or uncomfortable to call for help in other ways. For example, if a belligerent person is standing in your lobby, it may be unwise to further escalate the situation by picking up a phone to call for assistance. A panic alarm can provide a quick and convenient way to summon help without drawing attention.

Silva Consultants feels that almost every business can benefit from the use of panic alarms. Places where panic alarms may be particularly beneficial include:

  • Receptionist’s desks in building lobbies.
  • Security stations and checkpoints.
  • Shipping/receiving areas.
  • Customer service counters.
  • Check-out counters and cashier’s stations.
  • Rooms where cash or other valuables are received, processed, or stored.
  • Interview rooms in Human Resources department.
  • Executive office suites.
  • Places where confrontations with the public are likely to occur.

Components of a Panic Alarm System

Panic alarms consist of two basic components:

Panic Button

The panic button is the device that the person activates when he or she needs help. There are many styles of panic buttons available. These can have a single pushbutton, two pushbuttons that must be pressed simultaneously, devices that must be squeezed, and devices that are activated by a foot or knee. There are also devices that can be covertly activated when cash or a product is removed at the request of a robber. Most panic buttons are specifically designed to resist accidental activation.

Panic buttons are normally installed in a location where they can easily be reached, yet out of view of the casual observer. In many cases, panic buttons are installed on the underside of a desk or countertop.

Panic buttons can be the wired type or wireless type. Wired panic buttons are connected using cabling. Wired panic buttons are very reliable, but it can sometimes be difficult and costly to get cable to each panic button location.

Wireless panic buttons use a short-range radio transmitter, similar to that used with a garage door opener. Wireless panic buttons are easy to install and can be placed just about anywhere.  Wireless panic buttons can also be carried around on the premises by employees if desired. Wireless panic buttons require batteries and need to be tested frequently to assure that they are operating properly.

Communications System

The communications system is the method that is used to summon help when a panic button is pressed. The type of communications system used depends largely on the resources available at the facility where the panic alarm is being installed and the level of security threat.

Types of communications systems used can include:

Communications to an off-site alarm monitoring center:

This method would typically be used at facilities that do not have an on-site security staff, such as at a small business. The panic buttons would be connected to an alarm control panel which sends a signal to the monitoring center when a panic button is pressed. The alarm monitoring center would then call the police or other appropriate people to respond to the site.

Communications to security control center:

Most large companies have some type of centralized security monitoring and control center, either on-site, or at a central location somewhere within their organization. When this type of resource exists, panic buttons are typically monitored at the control center. Most often, panic buttons are connected to the organization’s access control and security management system, which transmits the alarm to the control center.

When a panic button is pressed, it sounds an alarm in the security control center. The center would then dispatch local security officers and/or the police to respond to the site.

Communications to non-security personnel:

Some organizations that do not have on-site security choose to notify non-security personnel when a panic button is pressed. Often, the organization will form a “response team” consisting of employees from multiple departments (Facilities, HR, etc.) and ask that these employees respond when a panic button is pressed.

There are various systems that can be used to notify the response team when a panic button has been pressed. These include can include overhead paging systems and devices that send voice messages, text messages, or email messages directly to smartphones.

Tips for Successfully Using Panic Alarms

  1. Panic alarms are worthless unless people know how to use them. Provide frequent training and make employees practice using panic buttons, particularly at positions where there is high employee turnover.
  2. When possible, provide a video surveillance camera that views each area where a panic button is installed. The panic alarm system should be interfaced to the video surveillance system to provide real-time recording when a panic button has been pressed. At facilities that have a security control center, the video surveillance system should automatically display the appropriate cameras at the control center whenever a panic button has been activated. This allows the center to assess the situation in order to send the proper response.
  3. Facilities that use a response team to respond to panic alarms should have some method to assess the situation before personnel enter the scene. Cameras that view panic button locations should be remotely viewable by response team members. This can be done using a computer on the network that has video viewing software, or by providing one or more dedicated video monitors.
  4. In some locations, different types of responses may be needed to handle different types of situations. For example, a drunk person in the lobby poses a different threat than an armed robber, yet employees may wish to have a method for discretely summoning help in either case. To handle this, it is possible to install what we call a “two-state” panic button. This button can be programmed so that two types of signals can be sent, one for true emergencies, and one for when help is needed but the situation doesn’t require an emergency response.

2 Comments » | Security Systems

Six Low-Tech Ways in Which Your Competitors May Be Spying on You

 :: Posted by Michael A. Silva on 08-23-2011

When people think of industrial espionage, they envision scenes from movies like James Bond or Mission Impossible, where the spy scales the wall, bypasses the alarm, forces open the safe, and makes off with the secret documents, barely avoiding capture. In other scenarios, people envision an industrial spy sneaking into the corporate boardroom to plant a listening device, or using sophisticated methods to tap into the phones or the computers carried by company executives.

While these types of attacks do occasionally happen, and receive a lot of sensational press coverage when they do, they are actually quite rare. Most actual industrial espionage is done using far more mundane methods, some of which can actually be legal.

Here are six low-tech ways in which spies may be able to gather intelligence on your organization:

Taking a Walk Around Your Building or Campus

It is amazing how much business intelligence a person can gather by simply walking around the exterior of your buildings and looking through your windows. This is particularly true in open campus settings where the public is allowed to roam freely between the buildings. Things that can be observed by looking through the windows commonly include:

  • Whiteboards or presentation pads that have sales data, marketing plans, or new product launch information written on them.
  • Prototypes of new products and packaging.
  • Materials associated with new advertising campaigns or promotions.
  • The names, job descriptions, and contact information for company employees.
  • The names of customers and suppliers.

Smart spies are aware of this easy method of gathering intelligence and may make regular trips to your campus to gather information by simply walking around. 

Looking Through Your Trash

Your trash and recycling bins can be a treasure trove for someone attempting to gather intelligence on your organization. Despite policies to the contrary, many employees continue to throw documents containing confidential information into the trash without shredding them first. Some items, such as prototypes of packaging for new products, can provide a competitor with valuable product development information yet are often thrown into the regular trash.

Sometimes, employees will follow proper disposal procedures when working at their desk, but fail to think about security when disposing of documents in places such as cafeterias or outdoor seating areas that may be open to the public.

Smart spies may attempt to gather confidential information from your trash, either directly, or by using an inside party to help them (such as a janitor, recycling company driver, etc.)

Overhearing Employee Conversations

In many cases, restaurants, bars, or coffee shops located near your campus may become informal gathering places for your employees. A person seeking to gather intelligence on your company can strategically place themselves so that they can overhear conversations taking place among employees.

As an example, we have a client who has a Starbucks store located about a block away from their headquarters in downtown Seattle. This store is used as a frequent gathering place for employees throughout the day, who can be identified by the company badges that they are wearing. By sitting in the vicinity of these employees, we were often able to overhear confidential business being discussed. One time, we were even able to overhear a group of employees rehearsing a sales presentation that they were planning to make to a major government agency later that day.

Smart spies may attempt to identify the places that are the likely hang-outs for your employees, and may deliberately go to these places in an attempt to overhear employee conversations.

Monitoring Social Media and Forums

Employees sometimes unknowingly disclose confidential company information when posting on business and social media sites such as Facebook and LinkedIn. Engineers, scientists and researchers often openly share information on technical forums and sometimes inadvertently disclose trade secrets and other information that their employers would rather keep private.

Smart spies will identify your key employees, and then attempt to monitor their postings to social and business media sites and forums. Most of this information is public and freely available.

Sometimes, something as innocent as posting your business travel plans can provide information that is useful to a spy. For example, one company learned that two of their major competitors were planning a merger because of frequent trips made by senior executives between the two cities in which the competitor’s respective corporate headquarters were located.  

Talking with Your Vendors

Most companies rely on a wide range of different types of vendors, including suppliers and contractors, to support their business operations. In many cases, these vendors are considered valued business partners and are given access to some of the company’s most important secrets.

While most vendors have honorable intentions, they typically don’t do business exclusively with you and probably also have similar relationships with some or all of your competitors. Sometimes in an attempt to appear knowledgeable or to make a sale, a vendor may deliberately or accidently leak confidential information about your company. Sometimes, these leaks may be the actions of an individual vendor employee and not sanctioned by the vendor company itself, but this doesn’t make them any less damaging.

Smart spies may deliberately target your vendors and suppliers to obtain confidential information about your company. They may pose as a potential customer wanting to buy a product or service, or as a reporter from a newspaper or magazine. They may even pose as someone from your own company, asking the vendor to send or otherwise disclose confidential information directly to them.

Talking with Your Current and Former Employees

Your current and former employees know a lot about your company. Sometimes, without knowing it, they can inadvertently disclose information that can be damaging to your company. They can be particularly vulnerable in social settings, where alcohol is be being consumed and their guard is down.

Smart spies may specifically develop relationships with your current or former employees to gather confidential information. The spy may get introduced through a “friend-of-a-friend”, or offer the employee a job or lucrative consulting assignment that can be performed without interfering with the employee’s regular job. Spies are especially likely to target employees with personal or financial problems, or employees that have issues with drug or alcohol abuse.

It should be kept in mind that intelligence gathering is a cumulative process. While any one piece of information in itself may not be of much value, a collection of multiple pieces of information can be assembled over time into something that is extremely valuable. A good spy recognizes this, and can often take a tiny scrap of leaked information and develop it exponentially into something that can be very damaging to your company.

For example, an overheard conversation in a coffee shop + a packaging prototype found in the trash + sales projections observed on a whiteboard + forum postings by an employee bragging about a new technology + material order information provided by a vendor can = a fairly complete picture of a new product that you are planning to launch. This information could allow an unscrupulous competitor to beat you to market with a copycat product, causing your company to lose revenue and possibly suffer great financial harm.

Things That You Can Do To Prevent Low-Tech Spying

  1. Employee security awareness training is the single most important preventive measure that you can take to prevent low-tech spying. Employees need to be made aware of the things targeted by industrial spies and the methods that may be used by spies to gather information.  Most employees are oblivious to the risks of corporate espionage and often compromise security for the sake of convenience or in an attempt to be helpful to others.
  2. Develop effective procedures for the disposal of sensitive documents and other confidential information. Conduct random inspections of trash and recycle bins to make sure that confidential material is not being disposed of improperly. (See Security Tip #2-4: Are You Throwing Your Company Secrets in the Trash.)
  3. Walk around your buildings to see what a spy could observe from the outside. If necessary, move whiteboards and presentation screens so that they cannot be observed from the outside. Make employees who have offices on the exterior of the building aware that the things that they have in their offices could potentially be observed by a spy. In general, anything that contains information that has not yet been released to the public should not be displayed within exterior offices.
  4. Educate and frequently remind employees of the potential risks of posting company-related information on social media sites and in forums.
  5. Educate and frequently remind employees about the risks of discussing company business with outsiders, especially in social settings. Employees should be particularly cautious when talking with people who they have just met or who appear to take an unusual interest in their work. Employees should also be cautious about being overheard when discussing company business in a public setting.
  6. Develop procedures for managing projects that involve confidential information. Use non-descriptive code names for projects. Compartmentalize projects to the greatest extent possible and only allow authorized employees to have access to project areas. Share information about the project with employees on a need to know basis. Limit the amount of confidential information shared with vendors. Don’t think that NDAs (non-disclosure agreements) alone will provide adequate protection of your intellectual property.
  7. Periodically use search engines such as Google to search for information about your company and your key employees. Visit business and social sites to see what is being written about your company and its employees. 

No Comments » | Sec Procedures, Spying

Introduction to Automatic Gates

 :: Posted by Michael A. Silva on 07-05-2011

 

Purpose

Automatic gates are used to control access into a secured area. Most commonly, automatic gates are used at the entrance to the facility, and are used to control vehicular access on and off of the site. For example, a manufacturing plant may use an automatic gate at its main entrance. All vehicles entering and exiting the plant must do so through the automatic gate. Automatic gates are also used at interior areas within a facility. For example, automatic gates are commonly used within the inside of a parking garage to separate employee parking areas from public areas of the garage.

Components of an Automatic Gate

Automatic gates consist of two basic components:

Gate: The gate is the physical object that is moved to block the gate opening. Most gates used in commercial applications are made of either ornamental iron or chain-link material and are usually designed to match the fencing adjacent to where the gate is installed.

Gate Operator: The gate operator is the machinery that moves the gate in and out of the gate opening. Gate operators are electrically-powered and may be chain-driven, gear-driven, or hydraulic depending on the type of operator.

Types of Automatic Gates

There are five types of commonly used automatic gates. These include the slide gate, cantilever gate, swing gate, vertical lift gate, vertical pivot lift gate, and barrier arm gate. The following is a brief description of each type of gate:

Slide Gate

The slide gate is probably the most commonly used type of automatic gate in light-duty commercial applications.

The slide gate is mounted parallel to the inside of the fence and slides horizontally back and forth across the gate opening. The slide gate uses rollers on the bottom of the gate to support it. These rollers typically ride along a metal track that has been installed along the ground across the gate opening. Slide gates are sometime also called “rolling gates” or “V-track gates”.

Because this type of gate uses rollers that must run along the ground, there can be problems with the rollers getting blocked by snow, ice, or debris. The rollers can also be a source of friction, making the gate operator have to work harder to open and close the gate. Due to these issues, some gate operator manufacturers discourage the use of slide gates.

Cantilever Gate

The cantilever gate is similar to the slide gate, but does not use rollers that slide along the ground to support it. Instead, the cantilever gate is supported from rails that run along the inside of the fence structure. This gate gets its name from the fact that the gate “cantilevers” (hangs over) the gate opening. Cantilever gates need to be much wider than slide gates in order to provide a section along the fence structure where the gate is supported. This section is called a “counterbalance” and is usually at least 1/2 the width of the gate opening itself

Cantilever gates are suspended across the gate opening from the counterbalance, with no rollers running along the ground to provide friction or to become obstructed. Because of this, cantilever gates are considered to be much more reliable than slide gates, and are commonly used for heavy-duty and industrial gate applications.

One downside to using cantilever gates is the additional width required to accommodate the counterbalance. This can be a problem at sites that have limited space available beside the gate.

Swing Gate

 

Swing gates are hinged on one side and swing open and closed like a door. Swing gates typically travel a 90 degree arc between their open and closed positions. Swing gates can consist of a single leaf or double leafs and can be in-swinging or out-swinging.

Swing gates are most commonly used in residential applications because of their low cost and ease of installation. Because swing gates travel over a large arc, space must be available to allow vehicles approaching the gate to remain clear while the gate opens or closes. The swinging arc of the gate also requires additional safety considerations to prevent people or vehicles from being hit or trapped by the moving gate.

Vertical Lift Gate

Vertical lift gates move up and down vertically over the gate opening. The gate must be lifted high enough to allow vehicles to pass underneath of it. This type of gate requires that tall vertical support towers be installed on each side of the gate opening.

Vertical lift gates are ideal when there is limited space available next to the gate opening. Vertical lift gates are also very fast and very reliable. The appearance of the vertical support towers gives these gates a very “industrial” appearance, which may make them unsuitable for use in locations where appearance is important.

Vertical Pivot Lift Gate

Vertical pivot lift gates rotate in and out of the gate opening. Vertical pivot lift gates are supported entirely from the gate operator itself and do not require any additional support structures.

Vertical pivot lift gates provide some of the benefits of vertical lift gates, but appear less obtrusive as they do not require vertical support towers. However, the footprint of a vertical pivot lift gate operator is larger and requires additional space beside the gate. Vertical pivot lift operators typically use springs to serve as a counterweight, and in our opinion, this makes them less reliable than a standard vertical lift gate.

 Barrier Arm Gate

Barrier arm gates consist of a vertical barrier arm that is rotated in and out of the gate opening. Barrier arm gates are used to control vehicles, not pedestrians.  As it is very easy for a person to walk beside or climb over or under the gate arm, barrier arm gates provide almost no security.

Barrier arm gates are used primarily to control access in and out of parking facilities, or to control vehicular traffic at manned security entrances.

Automatic Gate Accessories

There are many accessories that may be used in conjunction with automatic gates. Some of these include:

  • Access control systems: Automatic gates can be operated by a variety of access control devices, including card readers, vehicle tag readers, digital keypads, and portable wireless transmitters. In most commercial installations, automatic gates are controlled by the same access control system that is used to control the entrance doors to the buildings, allowing the same access card to be used in both places.
  • Intercom systems: Intercom stations are often provided at automatic gates to give visitors and delivery drivers a means to contact someone inside the facility when the gate is closed. Most of these systems will allow the gate to be remotely opened by someone inside the facility once the visitor’s identity has been verified.
  • Video surveillance systems: Video cameras can be used to view and record activity at the gate. The video surveillance system can be used in conjunction with the intercom system. This allows the identity of visitors to be visually confirmed before opening the gate.
  • Free exit devices: In many cases, it is desirable to have the gate open automatically when a vehicle exits the property. Devices that can be used to provide free exit include loop detectors, photoelectric beams, and pressure switches.
  • Post office and utility company access: The post office and many utility companies may require a means to enter through the gate. This usually requires the use of one or more key-operated switches that are keyed to the post office’s or utility company’s standard key.
  • Emergency access: Most fire departments and many law enforcement agencies require a means to gain access to your property through your gate at all times. Devices used to provide access can include key boxes (Knox Boxes), strobe or siren activated sensors, and radio receivers that can be activated by the emergency vehicle’s two-way radio.

Gate Safety Devices

Automatic gates can weigh as much as 20,000 pounds or more and can travel at speeds as high as 36 inches per second or faster. As a result, gates have the potential to cause serious property damage, injury or death. Therefore, it is extremely important that safety considerations be included when planning any type of automatic gate installation.

The primary guideline for automatic gate safety is Underwriters Laboratories (UL) Standard 325. This standard defines classes of automatic gate operators and the various techniques that should be used to prevent entrapment and reduce the potential for injury. Gate safety measures can include warning signage, audible warning devices, photoelectric sensors, contact (pressure) sensors, screening, safety cages, and other devices.

Because some of the requirements of UL 325 are difficult and costly to implement, many gate installers have chosen to downplay or ignore these requirements. It is often easy to get away with this because there is little enforcement of these standards in many parts of the country. However, the property owner who installs an automatic gate that is in violation of recognized standards does so at his own peril and may be held liable if someone is injured by the gate. 

Considerations When Choosing an Automatic Gate

The following are some basic things that must be considered when choosing an automatic gate:

  • Opening size: The overall size of the opening will be a major determining factor in deciding what type of automatic gate to use. In general, the wider the gate opening, the more expensive it will be to install a gate. While gate widths of over 80′ are possible, gate widths over 40′ tend to be more expensive and more problematic. 
  • Availability of Space: the amount of space available on all sides surrounding the gate can limit the type of automatic gate that can be used. If the facility is located on a large rural site  that has plenty of space, probably just about any type of automatic gate can be used. Facilities located in crowded urban or downtown areas where space is at a premium may be limited to only one or two options for automatic gates.
  • Weight of gate: The overall weight of the gate determines the type and grade of gate operator required. In general, the wider and taller the gate, the more it will weigh. Gates of the same size will weigh differently depending on whether they are constructed of steel, aluminum or wood. Allowance must also be made for any increase in weight  that may be caused by accumulations of rain, snow, or ice on the gate surfaces.
  • Opening and Closing Speed: Different applications require different opening and closing speeds. While slow opening speeds can be acceptable in residential and some commercial applications, they are totally unacceptable in high-volume industrial applications such as at a distribution center or airport. Opening speeds that are too slow can cause traffic backups and user frustration. Closing speeds that are too slow can encourage “tailgating” and other security violations.
  • Duty Cycle: The number of times the gate will be opened and closed each day must be considered when selecting an automatic gate operator. Certain types of gate operators designed for residential use may only be intended to be cycled a dozen times per day or less. These types of gate operators will fail quickly in an industrial environment where the gate is cycled hundreds of times per hour on a 24 per hour per day, 365 day a year basis.
  • Grade: Most gate operators are designed to operate gates that are on a level, flat grade. Gates that must open or close going up or down an incline can cause excessive wear on the gate operator and lead to premature  failure.
  • Gate Construction: Simply adding a gate operator to a gate that was originally designed for manual operation can be a real mistake. Gates need to be specifically designed for automatic operation. Special types of rollers, bearings and other hardware are often needed to make a gate work reliably with an automatic gate operator. These items add relatively little cost to the overall installation, but make a big difference in gate performance and reliability.
  • Weather Conditions: Special precautions must be taken when installing gates in regions where there are extreme hot or cold temperatures, high winds, or heavy snow or ice.
  • Location: The type of neighborhood where the automatic gate is being installed must be considered when specifying a gate. In general, gates being installed near residential areas(where children are likely to be present) require more stringent safety measures than gates being installed in purely industrial environments.  
  • Electrical Power: While some light-duty gate operators will work with standard 110/120 VAC electrical power, most medium and heavy-duty gate operators will require 220/240 VAC or three-phase electrical power. It can sometimes be difficult and costly to get this type of power to the place where the gate will be installed.

Conclusion

Deciding which type of automatic gate to use is a big decision. Automatic gates are expensive to install and require regular ongoing maintenance. Sometimes, purchasing a more expensive gate initially can actually save you money over the long-run due to reduced maintenance costs. Many architects and builders will specify the cheapest gate possible when the facility is being built. The property owner then has to live with the consequences, which can include frequent downtime and costly repairs.

If you are not sure what type of gate or gate operator to use, it is recommended that you retain the services of a professional engineer or independent security consultant to help you assess your needs and to select the correct product.

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Three Dirty Little Secrets about Video Surveillance Systems

 :: Posted by Michael A. Silva on 06-07-2011

 

Dirty Little Secret #1 – Security Cameras Rarely Serve as a Deterrent to Crime

Despite an almost universal belief otherwise, there is no conclusive evidence that video surveillance systems serve as a deterrent to crime. While a few studies have shown that there may be a decrease in crime when cameras are installed in certain settings, such as publically-operated parking garages, there are many more studies that have shown that the installation of security cameras has no effect whatsoever on crime rates.

While more independent  studies are needed, the evidence at this point suggests that security cameras rarely prevent crimes from occurring, and almost certainly don’t deter crime to the degree that is implied by many sellers and installers of video surveillance equipment.

The following should be considered when contemplating the deterrent effect of video surveillance cameras:

  • Most people who engage in criminal behavior don’t have the same thought processes that honest people do and don’t consider the long-term consequences of their actions.
  • Many people who commit crimes aren’t thinking rationally at the time they commit them. They may be drunk, high on drugs, or suffering from some form of mental illness.
  • Smart criminals are well-aware of the limitations of video surveillance systems and may plan their crimes around them. They may commit crimes just outside of the range of cameras, or wear simple disguises to conceal their identity.
  • People become desensitized to the presence of video cameras after a short time. While there may be an awareness of cameras when they are first installed, they soon become part of the environment, making regular occupants of the area almost oblivious to their presence.

Dirty Little Secret #2 – Most Recorded Video is Useless as Evidence

The goal of most video surveillance systems is to provide recorded evidence when a crime has been committed, allowing the criminal suspect to be quickly identified, captured, and prosecuted. Ideally, the recorded video would show the criminal in the act: stealing the computer, vandalizing the car, or assaulting the victim. Images on the recorded video would provide a good picture of the suspect, allowing his facial features, clothing, and any distinguishing marks to be clearly recognized. When the suspect is captured and brought to trial, the video evidence would be compelling enough that a jury would be convinced of the suspect’s guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt”.

While this type of scenario is often played out on television shows and in movies, it rarely occurs in the real world. Most users of commercial video surveillance systems are deeply disappointed when they discover that the system that they have purchased can’t provide recorded video that is useful as evidence. This dissatisfaction usually comes to light when the user reviews recorded images in an attempt to investigate a crime after the fact. Complaints frequently heard are: “I can see the person, but can’t identify who it is”; “I can see the person, but I can’t see what they are carrying”; “I can see a car, but can’t tell the make or model or read the license plate”; “when I enlarge the picture, it is nothing but a blur!” ; “the view of the camera is blocked in exactly the area that I want to see”.

Most problems related to the quality of recorded images can be attributed to the following:

  • Too few cameras with too wide a field-of-view: Cameras can view a wide area, or provide a high-level of detail, but not both. Many cameras are set to view an excessively large area, which makes it impossible to positively identify people at most points within the scene.  A study by the FBI suggested that, in order for a person’s face to be positively identified, the person must equal approximately 120% of the vertical height of the video image. To get this type of image requires an extremely narrow field of view, allowing each camera to cover only a very small area. While not everyone agrees with this study, almost everyone admits that most cameras installed today have fields of view that are set too wide to allow facial recognition throughout most of their coverage area.
  • Improper viewing angle: To best identify a person, a camera needs to have a relatively straight-on shot of the person’s face. Many cameras are installed too high, at the wrong angle, or pointed so that they only see the side of the face or the back of the head. For example, at building entrances, it is common to only have a camera inside pointing out towards the door. While this camera can provide a good view of someone entering the building, it can only see the back side of a person exiting.
  • Blind spots in coverage area: There are lots of obstructions in settings such as parking garages or warehouses. Cameras can’t see through structural columns, parked trucks or stacks of pallets, often creating conditions where large portions of the facility cannot be seen by a camera.
  • Improper lighting conditions: Cameras need to have an adequate amount of light in order to see. More importantly, the lighting needs to be uniform throughout the viewing area. Too little light or the combination of bright areas and dark areas within the viewing area will usually produce a poor quality image.
  • Improper recording resolution setting: There is a tradeoff between the video resolution used for recording and the amount of time that images can be stored on the recording device. The higher the resolution, the less recording time. In many cases, the resolution setting has been set to an unacceptably low rate in an attempt to maximize recording time.

While all of the problems identified above are solvable, the cost of doing so can be prohibitive in many applications.

Although it is relatively easy and cost effective to get good quality recorded video in small, confined areas such as at building entrances or at teller’s windows, it can be much more challenging and expensive to cover large open areas such as parking garages and warehouses. Most property owners don’t want to spend the money that it takes to properly provide evidentiary quality video coverage throughout their facilities, as this can require many more cameras and much more recording equipment than they originally planned on installing. Instead, they choose to install far fewer cameras than are actually needed and hope for the best. They are often aided and abetted in this effort by security integrators, who would rather sell just a few cameras than none at all. The net result: a video surveillance system that fails to meet the owner’s needs and is incapable of providing recorded video that is useful as evidence.

Dirty Little Secret #3 – “Megapixel” Security Cameras Won’t Cure All Video Surveillance Problems

New high-resolution video cameras have been introduced in recent years and these cameras are now becoming popular in the video surveillance industry. Offering resolutions of up to 16 megapixels (MP) and higher, these cameras promise to provide a quality of video that is substantially better than that provided by traditional standard definition (SD) cameras.

Many manufacturers  and security integrators have been quick to tout the benefits of these cameras, claiming that they are the cure to all of the weaknesses of traditional video surveillance systems. Some of the claims that we have heard by manufacturers include: “one megapixel camera can replace up to ten of your standard fixed-position cameras”; “there is no longer any need for pan-tilt-zoom cameras – our 360 degree megapixel camera can view and record all areas all the time”; and “our megapixel cameras will finally allow you to positively identify faces and read license plates throughout your parking lots”…, etc.

Our actual experiences in seeing megapixel cameras in use at some of our clients facilities paints a somewhat less flattering picture. While megapixel cameras can be beneficial in many applications, it is our opinion that the capabilities of megapixel camera have been greatly oversold by many manufacturers.

Some of our findings include:

  • Megapixel cameras work best in indoor applications where lighting is adequate and doesn’t vary significantly throughout the day. In these conditions, megapixel cameras are capable of providing a significantly better quality image than that provided by a standard definition camera.
  • Using megapixel cameras in outdoor applications can be a real challenge. While the image quality provided during the day can be great, the image quality at night can be the same or even worse than that provided by a standard definition video camera. Users who install megapixel cameras outdoors for improved nighttime picture quality are likely to be disappointed.
  • The increased resolution provided by megapixel cameras can provide an improved ability to make out facial details and license plates when the camera’s field of view is properly focused on the area of interest and lighting conditions are correct. In some cases, this may allow the use of fewer cameras to cover the same scene, however it is still unrealistic to expect a single megapixel camera to cover a large area. Thinking that you can install just a handful of megapixel cameras to get evidentiary quality video coverage throughout your entire parking garage is unrealistic.
  • The installation of megapixel cameras can’t solve problems such as blockage of view, improper viewing angle, and poor lighting conditions.
  • The quality of images produced by megapixel  cameras can vary greatly by manufacturer, particularly in real-world surveillance applications. Cameras with a higher megapixel rating don’t necessarily produce better quality images than cameras with a lower megapixel rating.

Our conclusions: megapixel cameras can provide improved performance in some applications, but they are not a “magic bullet” that will automatically solve all of your video surveillance problems.

Summary

Video surveillance systems can be a useful tool when designed and installed correctly, and when the user has realistic expectations about what they can and cannot accomplish. In many cases, users will install video surveillance cameras as a “quick fix” when they are having a security problem, without considering that cameras may not be the correct solution. Cameras installed under these circumstances are almost always a waste of money.

We recommend that clients develop a comprehensive security plan for their facility before making the decision to install security cameras. This plan should be based on a security risk assessment and address all aspects of security including security policies and procedures, employee training, architectural security, and electronic security systems.

While video cameras can be part of your overall security plan, they are rarely a security solution in themselves.

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Security of Warehouses and Distribution Centers

 :: Posted by Michael A. Silva on 05-25-2011

Warehouses and distribution centers are frequent targets of burglary, theft and pilferage. These facilities contain lots of new merchandise in its original packaging, something that is highly-desirable to both professional and amateur thieves.

The large quantity of merchandise in most warehouses also brings out an emotional feeling within many people that suggests: “Wow, there are so many of these items, they won’t miss just one…”. This feeling can sometimes tempt people who otherwise wouldn’t think of themselves as criminals.

Warehouses are subject to both internal and external theft. Internal thefts are committed by company employees, contractors, and other “insiders” who have a legitimate reason to be in the warehouse at certain times. External thefts are committed by “outsiders”- people outside of the company who have no legitimate need to be in the warehouse and are coming to the facility specifically to steal.

Truck drivers and other types of delivery service drivers can pose a specific security risk. Some drivers have gotten into the habit of stealing from their customers when making a pick-up or delivery, and consider this to be a justifiable “fringe benefit” given the inadequate wages that they feel they are making. Drivers are often allowed to wander freely while their trailer is being loaded or unloaded and can use this opportunity to gather up items that they wish to steal. It is often easy to place additional items into the trailer after it has been loaded, or to place stolen items into the cab of the truck unnoticed.

Along the same lines, many warehouse employees feel that they are underpaid and underappreciated, and look at stealing from the warehouse as a way to supplement their income and to get back at their employer at the same time. There are variety of ways in which warehouse employees can steal: some simply load merchandise into their car during the day; others place merchandise in trash bins and come back later to retrieve it; and still others may pack merchandise into a box and ship it to themselves using a bogus address that they have established just for this purpose.

Sometimes, dishonest warehouse employees work in conjunction with dishonest truck drivers to steal from the company. This can be a particularly dangerous combination: the warehouse employee has knowledge of what’s coming and going, can plant stolen merchandise in outgoing shipments, and can modify paperwork to cover his tracks – while the truck driver has the means to remove the merchandise from the warehouse. Collusion between warehouse employees and truck drivers is a big problem in some industries and is responsible for multiple millions of dollars of losses each year.

Here are a few suggestions for providing good security at warehouses and distribution centers:

  • Try to separate areas used for Shipping away from areas used for Receiving. When possible, provide physical barriers between these two areas.
  • Where possible, provide a separately fenced yard area that encloses the warehouse shipping and receiving doors. Establish a policy that prohibits personal vehicles from being driven into the shipping and receiving yard area. Keep the gate to the exterior yard area locked at times when the warehouse is closed.
  • Do not allow employee or visitor parking near warehouse shipping and receiving doors.
  • Do not allow truck drivers to wander through your warehouse. If possible, provide dedicated “driver lounge” for use by drivers. Driver lounge should contain restrooms and other amenities that can be used by drivers while they are waiting for their trailers to be loaded or unloaded. Access to driver lounge should not require travel through interior warehouse areas.
  • Exterior trash and recycle containers should not be directly accessible from the inside of the warehouse. If possible, locate exterior trash and recycle containers away from building. Keep trash and recycle containers locked. Establish procedures for trash removal that requires at least two employees to be present when trash is being removed from the building.
  • When possible, the warehouse manager’s office should be located so that direct visual observation of the shipping and receiving bay doors from the office is possible.
  • Avoid stacking merchandise directly in front of shipping and receiving doors – try to maintain a “clear-zone of at least ten feet.
  • Don’t leave valuables sitting unattended on exterior loading docks or platforms.
  • Provide separate areas for the storage of valuable or highly desirable items, such as computer and electronic equipment, cigarettes, liquor, baby formula, expensive clothing, etc. If possible. create separately lockable “high-value” cages or rooms for the storage of these items.
  • Use an electronic access control system to control access into high-value rooms or cages. Access control system should be capable of providing audit trail of who entered and when.
  • Provide video surveillance system to record activity in high value cages and rooms. Cameras should be placed to view entrance points as well as interior areas.
  • Consider instituting policy where at least two employees must be present in order to enter a high-value cage or room (“two-man rule”).
  • In locations where overhead doors must be left open for ventilation purposes, provide folding metal security gates to protect the door opening when the door is left open. Consider the use of an electronic door monitoring system that sounds an alert when both the overhead door and the folding gate have been left open for longer than a specified time period.
  • Strictly limit the number of exterior doors that can be used for employee entrance and exit. Avoid having entrance doors where they cannot be observed by staff. Provide audible exit alarms on all doors designated as emergency exit only doors. Consider the use of delayed-egress devices on emergency exit doors that are being frequently misused.
  • Establish procedures to control outgoing shipments to prevent employees from making unauthorized shipments to themselves.
  • Avoid situations where trailers filled with merchandise are stored in your warehouse yard at times when the warehouse is closed. If trailers containing merchandise must be stored outside, consider installing an intrusion alarm system to protect the exterior yard area and/or the trailers themselves.
  • Large warehouses and distribution centers should have manned security checkpoints at the entrances to the site. All outbound trucks should be required to stop at the checkpoint for inspection prior to leaving the site. At smaller warehouses where a manned checkpoint cannot be justified, consider having a supervisor or security officer make unannounced checks of outbound vehicles on a random basis.

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