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Effective Key Management Procedures

Jan 22

Posted by masilva in Lock Hardware, Security Management | No Comments

Introduction

Despite the widespread use of electronic card access control systems, most facilities still make extensive use of traditional locks and keys at their facilities. It is still much less expensive to equip a door with a standard lock than it is with any type of electronic access control device. For these reasons, most organizations equip only a small percentage of their doors with electronic access devices, and install traditional locks on the majority of their other doors.

Because traditional locks and keys continue to be widely used, it is important that effective security management procedures be put into place to effectively control them.

Lock System Selection

The first step in effective key management begins with the initial selection of the lock system. The first decision is what type of lock system should be used, a “standard security lock system”, or “high-security lock system”. A standard security lock system is less expensive, widely available,  and offers more flexibility in the way that keys can be duplicated. High-security lock systems offer much greater security but are more expensive, available through fewer channels, and generally require that duplicate keys be obtained only through authorized distributors. (See related article High-Security Locks for more information).

Once the type of lock system has been decided upon, the next decision is to choose a lock manufacturer. In many cases, selecting a lock manufacturer also chooses the type of lock cylinders and key that will be used. For example, a series of locks manufactured by the “XYZ Lock Company” probably comes with XYZ lock cylinders and XYZ keys. Cylinders and keys are generally not interchangeable between brands, so once an organization picks one brand of lock and key, they usually need to stick with it.

(High-security lock systems can be the exception to this rule – high-security lock cylinders can often be installed in locks produced by other manufacturers. This allows locks to be upgraded to use high-security keys without requiring that the lock itself be replaced.)

Lock System Design and Keying

Once a type and brand of lock system has been chosen, the next step is to design the system and to determine how it will be “keyed”. This process is normally facilitated by the architectural hardware consultant who is specifying the lock system. The process generally involves creating a matrix that shows all doors in the building, identifying all of the categories of employees that require access through these doors, and establishing which categories of employees need access through each of the doors.

Once this process is completed, the hardware  consultant will design the keying system and create keying chart. This chart may be simple or complicated depending on the type of facility and total number of doors to be controlled. An example of a simple keying chart is shown below.

Simple Keying Chart

The chart shows three levels of keying. The keys at the lowest level are known as “Change Keys”. These keys typically allow access to only a single area or department. For example, in the chart above, the Accounting change key would only allow access into the Accounting Department, and the Human Resources change key would only allow access to the Human Resources department.

The keys at the next level are known as “Master Keys”. These keys allow access to all of the areas or departments shown below them on the keying chart. For example, in the chart above, the Administration Master Key would allow access to both the Accounting Department and Human Resources Department.

The key at the top of the chart is known as the “Grand Master Key”. This key would typically allow access to all areas and all departments in the facility.

The design of a keying system can be a very complex subject and this article just touches on some of the basics. However, when designing a keying system, the following should be considered:

  • There is always a trade-off between security and convenience. While it is very convenient for a manager to have a grand master key that opens every door on the premises, consider the damage that would be caused if this key fell into the wrong hands. Also, having such a key lost or stolen would require rekeying the entire facility – a very costly proposition.
  • When using standard security lock cylinders, master keying makes the lock more susceptible to both “picking” and “bumping”.
  • High-security areas in the facility sometimes should be keyed so that they are not part of the master key system. This is sometimes called keying “off-master”. In some cases, this may be mandated by regulatory requirements. For example, in hospitals, only registered pharmacists are allowed access to pharmacy areas; even the top executives of the hospital are not allowed to enter the pharmacy unless a pharmacist is present. However, keying locks off-master should be done sparingly, otherwise you may end up with a complicated and unwieldy key system.
  • The keying system should be designed to accommodate future growth. For example, if you are constructing one building in a campus that is expected to eventually have three buildings, the keying system should be designed with this in mind.

Using Keys in Conjunction With Electronic Access Control Systems

Doors that are equipped with card readers or other access control devices often have lock cylinders on them to allow them to also be opened with a key.

It is our recommendation that these lock cylinders not be keyed to any key that is routinely carried by employees, including master keys. Having the ability to open an access-controlled door with a key causes false door-forced-open alarms and defeats the accountability feature provided by the access control system.  (See related article Solving the False “Door-Forced-Open” Alarm Problem  )

We recommend that lock cylinders on access-controlled doors be keyed to a special “emergency key” that is used only in the event of system failure. These keys should be kept in a secure location and only issued in the event of an extended access control system failure.

Determining Who Gets Which Keys

Determining who has access to which areas in the facility is an important decision. Some security or facility managers feel pressure to give keys out to anyone who requests them, regardless of need. This is particularly true when the request is being made by a senior executive or manager.

We recommend the following:

  • Written policies and procedures for key issuance and management should be developed and approved by the company’s senior leadership. Once these policies and procedures have been approved, they should be consistently applied.
  • Keys should be issued strictly based on job responsibilities and not seen as a symbol of rank within the organization. Not every manager, director or vice president needs to have a grand master key.
  • Access privileges should be based on normal needs and not exceptions. For example, an employee may be assigned to the Accounting Department and work a majority of his time there, but once or twice per year, he may be called in to work in the Payroll Department. This employee should be assigned a key that works only in the Accounting Department. A key that works in the Payroll Department should be temporarily assigned to the employee only while he is working there and returned when he goes back to his regular job.
  • Many employees request keys that provide access beyond what they need on a daily basis just so that they can respond “in an emergency”. For example, a nighttime supervisor in the Manufacturing Department may claim he needs a master key for the Administrative Offices so that he can get in case of a fire or a water leak. Again, the rule should be to issue access privileges based only on routine needs, and have a procedure in place to allow special access in an emergency.

Key Authorization and Issuance Procedures

Good key authorization and issuance procedures are an essential part of any effective key management system. The following is recommended:

  • All requests for keys should be made on a written Key Authorization Form. Electronic forms may be used as an alternative provided that a reliable method is used to authenticate signatures. An example Key Authorization Form is shown below.
  • Key requests should always be submitted and approved by a second party. In most cases, this will be the employee’s supervisor or manager. An employee should never be able to request and approve a key for himself.
  • Keys that provide access to high-security or hazardous areas should have the approval of the manager that “owns” that area in addition to the employee’s supervisor. For example, a request for a maintenance employee to have access to a Lab area might require the approval of both the Maintenance Manager and the Lab Director.
  • Keys are always issued to individual people, not to departments or companies. For example, if all employees of the IT Department need access to a specific room, each employee should be individually assigned a key. It should never be acceptable for a department head to say “send me up five keys for my people” or to maintain a local stock of unassigned keys that he can hand out at his discretion.
  • All keys should be stamped with a unique key identifier and serial number. The serial number of each key issued to an employee should be recorded on the Key Authorization Form.
  • All employees should be required to personally sign for keys when they are issued.

 

Key Authorization Fom

Getting Keys Back from Employees When They Leave

The biggest key management problems that many organizations face involves getting keys back from employees when they leave the organization. Some typical problems include:

  • Employee quits or is terminated and fails to return keys at the time of their departure.
  • Employee fails to return to work and is terminated but keys are never retrieved.
  • Employee leaves company and turns keys in to departmental supervisor or manager. Keys are kept in department and never returned to person responsible for managing the key system.
  • Employee is promoted or transferred to another department or site and is issued keys for new job but fails to return keys from previous job.

Solving these problems requires close cooperation with your Human Resources (HR) Department. HR is normally involved in every employee resignation, termination or transfer and usually conducts an exit interview with employees on their last day of work. HR should have access to key records so that they know which keys have been issued to each employee. Retrieving the employees keys (as well as access card and other company-owned property) should be an integral part of the exit interview process. When HR receives returned keys, they should be forwarded to the person or department that manage the key system for the organization.

Reporting Lost or Stolen Keys

Employees should be encouraged to report lost or stolen keys immediately. Sometimes, an employee may misplace his or her key and not report it missing right away, thinking that the key may have been left at home or in another place. This can allow several days to transpire between the time a key is first missed and when it is reported lost.

Some organizations charge employees for replacement keys or even make employees pay for all or part of the expense of rekeying locks when a key is lost. In our opinion, this is a poor practice as it often discourages employees from reporting lost or stolen keys. We think it is better for an organization to know that a key has been compromised and bear the expense of rekeying rather than not to know about it at all.

Dealing With Exceptions

Procedures need to be in place to get keys to those who need them under special circumstances. Examples can include employees who temporarily need a key to an area other than their normal workplace, and contractors or service technicians who need keys to work on a specific project.

It is recommended that some type of secure key storage system be used. These can include wall-mounted key cabinets, file cabinets with hanging key files, and drawers used to store keys that have been sealed in small envelopes.

The key storage system should provide the ability to identify and locate each of the keys quickly, and to identify keys which are missing or have not been returned. A written key issuance log should be kept that tracks who each key has been issued to, who approved it, when the key was issued, when it is expected to be returned, and when it was actually returned.

Key Issuance Log

The key issuance log should be periodically audited to identify keys that are missing or which have not been returned at the agreed upon time. Audits should be conducted by the person managing the key system on at least a weekly basis. In addition, independent audits should be conducted by an outside party (such as the security manager) on at least a monthly basis.

To more effectively manage the key storage and issuance process, there are automated key cabinets available. These cabinets store and dispense keys and maintain an electronic record of which key has been issued to who and when. The cabinets also allow alerts to automatically be sent by email when a key isn’t returned as expected. Automated cabinets typically require the use of a numeric PIN code in order to remove or return a key. Some cabinets are also capable of using the employee’s proximity access card to operate the cabinet and remove a key.

Automatic key cabinets are fairly expensive and not right for everyone, but can be a good choice for larger organizations who sign in and out a large number of keys on a daily basis

Automated Key Cabinet

Emergency Access

Many fire departments now require that that keys to the building be kept in a fire department key boxes (often called “Knox Boxes”) located outside of the building. These key boxes are exclusively for the use of emergency responders and cannot be used by company employees. (See related article Security Vulnerabilities Created by Fire Department Key Boxes )

There are cases where employees may need emergency access into areas where they are not ordinarily allowed. If the facility has security officers on duty 24/7, emergency access to locked areas usually can be provided by the on-duty officer.

For facilities without 24/7 security, the best choice is to use an emergency key box. These key boxes are locked but have a breakable glass front. When emergency access to a key is needed, the glass is broken and the key inside removed. The emergency key box should be kept is an area that is secure but accessible to employees who may need to use it. A tamper switch connected to the building’s intrusion alarm or security management system should be provided so that an alarm signal is received anytime a key is removed from the emergency key box.

A written security report  should be required anytime that a security officer unlocks a door to provide emergency access or whenever an emergency key box is used.

Emergency Key Box

 

If you have questions about anything in this article, or need help in planning effective key management procedures for your organization, please Contact Us.

Bad Shear Locks

Jan 22

Posted by masilva in Access Control, Lock Hardware | No Comments

Electromagnetic “shear locks” are a popular choice of architects because the lock mechanism can be completely concealed with the door frame. Unfortunately, our experience with these types of locks has been almost entirely negative. First of all, the door must align perfectly in order for these locks to work. If the door doesn’t fully close and seat properly in the opening, the lock will not bond properly. It’s tough to get a door to align perfectly when its new, and nearly impossible to keep it aligned properly as the door ages.

Second, many of our clients have reported that electromagnetic shear locks are very noisy. When the door closes, the electromagnet in the door frame pulls the armature mounted at the top of the door against the lock. This metal on metal contact can make a loud “clunking” sound that many users find annoying. This noise can be particularly pronounced in places that have hard acoustical surfaces such as building lobbies.

We strongly urge our clients not to use electromagnetic shear locks. In several cases, these locks were installed during new construction but proved to be so unreliable that the building owner decided to replace them with frame mounted electromagnetic locks.  The shear locks were left in the door frame so that there wouldn’t be a need to install a filler plate. This creates a condition where there appears to be two locks on the door, even though the shear locks are no longer operational.

Here are a couple of actual examples of where frame mounted locks were used to replace shear locks:

Example #1:

Example #2:

 

Please Contact Us if you have any questions or need help in solving any type of security door hardware problem.

 

High-Security Locks

May 3

Posted by masilva in Lock Hardware | No Comments

Manual, key-operated locks are the most common type of security device used to control access through doors. While many companies have installed sophisticated electronic access control systems, the manual lock is still used on most doors. In addition, many doors that are controlled by an electronic access control system still have a manual lock on them that allows override using a key.

Most manual locks that are in use today are using technology that was developed more than eighty years ago. While this technology has proven reliable, standard manual locks have many weaknesses. Some of these weaknesses include:

  • Keys to standard locks can be duplicated: Most standard locks use keys that can be easily duplicated by any locksmith or key shop. Stamping “Do Not Duplicate” on the key offers little protection; many key shops will duplicate the key despite the warning. Once the owner has given out a standard key, he can never be sure just how many copies of the key might have been made.
  • Standard locks can be “picked” open: Most standard lock cylinders can be opened using lock picks or a device known as a “pick gun”. While some standard locks require a level of skill to pick, many locks can be opened easily by the novice. Inexpensive locks and locks that have been master-keyed are often easiest to pick.
  • Standard locks can be “drilled” open: Most standard lock cylinders can be easily drilled open. This has become an increased problem since the introduction of cordless drills.

To solve many of the weaknesses of standard locks, “high-security” locks have been developed. There are many different brands and styles of high-security locks, but most offer the following benefits:

  • Patented or Restricted Keys: Most high-security locks use keys that are patented or otherwise restricted. Distribution of key blanks is strictly limited, and special equipment is required to duplicate keys. Duplicate keys are generally only available through qualified locksmiths or the factory, and only upon written authorization of the facility owner or his designated representatives. Because it is extremely difficult for an unauthorized person to obtain a duplicate key, the facility owner can be fairly confident of the number of keys to his facility that are in circulation.
  • Virtually “Pickproof”: Most high-security locks use special mechanisms that make them extremely difficult, if not impossible, to “pick” open. While there are a handful of champion locksmiths in the world who might be able to pick open a high-security lock if given enough time, picking a lock of this type is generally beyond the capabilities of even the most seasoned of criminals.
  • Drill Resistant: Most high-security locks are designed to resist attacks by drilling. Protective measures can include the use of a hardened metal case, special hardened metal pins or disks placed in the path where the drill must penetrate, and special metal shields to prevent attack on the lock itself. While most high-security locks can be drilled open, this is a time consuming and difficult task.

Silva Consultants strongly recommends the use of high-security locks, particularly on the exterior doors of your facility. High-security locks are also a good choice for use on doors that lead into areas that contain sensitive information or high-value assets

Delayed-Egress Locking Systems on Exit Doors

May 3

Posted by masilva in Lock Hardware | No Comments

For safety reasons, building and fire codes require a specific number of exit doors out of every occupied portion of the building. In most cases, at least two exits out of each room is required. Many times, doors are installed specifically as “emergency exits”, and are used for no other purpose. Exit doors must allow exit at all times and therefore must be kept unlocked in the direction of exit.

Unfortunately, exit doors can often create a security weakness. This is especially true when they are located in out of the way places that are unattended by employees or security personnel. For example, in a retail store, emergency exit doors are often located in the rear of the store, far away from the front check-out area. A thief can grab merchandise, and then quickly run out one of the exit doors. A similar type of vulnerability exists in many other types of commercial and institutional settings, where items of value can be taken out of the building through an emergency exit door.

To combat this problem, emergency exit doors are often equipped with “exit alarms”. Exit alarms are installed on the emergency exit door, and will cause an audible alarm to sound when the exit door is opened.

Exit alarms do a good job of discouraging misuse of the emergency exit doors by employees and the general public, but don’t always stop a more aggressive thief. This is because the thief knows that it will take time for an employee or a security person to respond to the door when the alarm sounds. This gives the thief ample time to grab the merchandise, and then quickly run out the door. The alarm sounds, but by the time an employee responds to the door, the thief is long gone.

In recognition of this problem, many building codes have been modified to allow the use of “delayed-egress locking systems” on emergency exit doors. The delayed egress locking system typically consists of an exit push bar, an auxiliary locking device, an audible alarm, and a special electronic control package. The delayed-egress locking system operates as follows:

  1. When a person approaches the door to exit, they press on the exit push bar. This causes the audible alarm to immediately sound, but does not unlock the door.
  2. The alarm continues to sound for a preset period (usually 15 seconds).
  3. At the end of the preset period, the door unlocks, allowing free exit.

The advantage of the delayed-egress locking system is that it provides a delay between the time that a person activates the alarm and when the door actually unlocks. This delay gives additional time for an employee or security person to respond to the door once the alarm has been activated. The delayed-egress locking system serves as a strong deterrent to the “grab and run” thief who doesn’t want to wait 15 seconds or more to make his exit from the premises.

Most building and fire officials will approve the installation of a delayed-egress locking system provided that the following requirements are met:

  • The building must be equipped with an approved automatic fire detection system or approved automatic fire sprinkler system.
  • The delayed-egress locking system must automatically unlock the doors upon activation of either the fire detection system or sprinkler system.
  • The delayed-egress locking system must automatically unlock upon failure of power to the locking system.
  • Upon activation of the exit push bar for a period of not more than 3 seconds, the system shall begin an irreversible process that releases the locking mechanism within 15 seconds (up to 30 seconds if approved by the authority having jurisdiction). The system shall sound an audible alarm at the door when the exit push bar has been pressed to provide assurance to those attempting to exit that the system is functional. Once the locking mechanism has been released, it shall remain unlocked until the system has been manually reset.
  • Appropriate signage must be provided at the door that reads: “PUSH UNTIL ALARM SOUNDS – DOOR CAN BE OPENED IN 15 SECONDS”. Lettering on sign shall be at least 1″ high.
  • Emergency lighting shall be provided at the door.
  • All components of the delayed-egress locking system shall be UL listed.

There are three basic types of delayed-egress locking systems.

The first type of delayed-egress system uses an electromagnetic lock in conjunction with either a standard mechanical push bar or an electronic “touch sense” bar. These types of systems generally require an external control panel.

The second type of delayed-egress system uses an electromagnetic lock that contains a built-in control system and a built-in “exit sensor”. The exit sensor detects when the door is pushed open and eliminates the need for any special type of exit push bar. This makes it ideal for retrofit installations on existing exit doors.

The third type of delayed-egress system uses a special type of mechanical exit device. All components of this system are contained within the exit device itself. This type of system minimizes the number of components required at the door and is best suited for new construction applications.

Here are a few things to consider before installing a delayed-egress locking system:

  • Be sure to obtain approval from the “authority having jurisdiction” (AHJ) before installing a delayed-egress system.
  • Most AHJ’s will not approve delayed-egress systems on exit doors for Group A (Assembly) occupancies. These occupancies typically include exhibition halls, auditoriums, gymnasiums, restaurants, nightclubs, libraries, museums, theaters and other such buildings where 50 or more persons may gather. It is especially important to obtain approval from the AHJ when contemplating the installation of a delayed-egress system in any such facility.
  • If the exit door is both an emergency exit door and a fire separation door, the hardware used on the door must provide positive latching of the door, even when it is unlocked. This normally requires the use of a fire-rated mechanical exit device on the door.
  • It is generally not acceptable to have more than one delayed-egress device along the path of travel to an exit. For example, if you had a delayed-egress device on a second floor door to a stairwell, it would not be acceptable to have another delayed-egress device on first floor door that exits this stairwell to the outside. 

Many delayed-egress systems offer a “nuisance” alarm feature. This feature minimizes false alarms by sounding a short audible tone whenever a person first presses on the door. If the person stops pressing on the door within one second, the tone stops, and the delay sequence is not initiated. If the person presses on the door for longer than one second, then the exit alarm sounds and the 15 second countdown begins.

Some delayed-egress systems now offer a voice announcement feature. This feature gives warning messages in a human voice and can provide a verbal countdown of the time remaining until the door unlocks.

Conflicts between Security and Life Safety Codes

May 3

Posted by masilva in Access Control, Lock Hardware | No Comments

As building access control systems become more popular, many facility owners are unknowingly violating building and life safety codes. Many pieces of security equipment commonly used by access control systems installers do not meet applicable life safety codes. Even though the use of this equipment is in many cases illegal, many installers continue to use it on a widespread basis. In most cases, this misapplication of equipment is due to ignorance of the applicable code requirements by the person selling and installing the equipment. Another contributing factor is that many fire department and building department officials are themselves unfamiliar with many pieces of security equipment and will often overlook violations when they do not fully understand the technology being used.

Building owners who install access control systems that violate provisions of the life safety code remain liable for any injuries or deaths that might be caused because exiting from the building was delayed by the use of improper equipment.

The design of all proposed access control systems should be reviewed by an architect, fire protection engineer, or independent security consultant to assure compliance with all applicable building and life safety codes.

General Safety Guidelines For Access Control Systems

  • In general, access control systems should always allow free passage out of required exit doors without requiring any special equipment or knowledge. Systems that require the use of a card or code to exit, systems that require that a pushbutton next to the door be pressed, or systems that require that a motion detector be activated generally do not meet this requirement.
  • Exit should be possible with a single operation, such as by pressing a push bar on the door. Doors that require that two or more operations (such as having to slide a bolt on the door and then turn a knob) to gain passage through the door are generally not acceptable.
  • Devices at required exit doors should not be dependent on the access control system to unlock. Mechanical means should be used for exiting whenever possible. When electrical unlocking is permitted, exit devices at the door should be wired to directly unlock the door without requiring that the input be processed by the access control system field panel.
  • Electromagnetic locks (“mag locks”) are the most commonly misapplied type of electric hardware. The use of electromagnetic locks on required exit doors almost always requires the use of a full-length exit bar (“touchsense bar”) across the door, and even then is usually permitted only upon special approval of the fire and building departments. Electromagnetic locks that require the use of a push button or motion detector to exit are almost always a violation of the building code.

Common Myths

  • Myth #1: Because this is not a building used by the general public, we don’t have to comply with the building codes concerning exiting. Reality: The exiting requirements for most buildings is determined by the type of occupancy, total floor space, and number of occupants. Most commercial buildings need to comply with the minimum exiting requirements specified above.
  • Myth #2: I can install any type of locking equipment I want on the exit doors just as long as I tie it to the fire alarm system to unlock upon fire alarm condition. Reality: Life safety codes are designed to permit rapid evacuation of the building in case of any emergency, not just a fire. Things like earthquakes, floods, chemical spills, etc. are events that require evacuation and may not trigger the fire alarm. As a result, connection to the fire alarm system is usually not an acceptable alternative to installing the correct hardware on the door.

Do Your Doors with Electric Strikes Latch Properly?

May 2

Posted by masilva in Lock Hardware | No Comments

Electric strikes are one of the most common types of lock hardware used with card access control systems.

Frequently, electric strikes are used with “cylindrical locks”, sometimes called “knob locks”. These locks are similar to the type that most people have on their doors at home. One common problem that occurs when cylindrical locks are used with electric strikes is that the “deadlatch” fails to work properly.

The “deadlatch” is a small metal piece that is located at the back of the latch assembly. The purpose of the deadlatch is to prevent the latch from being pushed back with a knife or credit card when the door is closed. When cylindrical locks are used with on doors without electric strikes, the deadlatch rests on the metal strike plate that is mounted on the door frame. The latch itself goes into the hole on the strike plate, but the deadlatch rests on the edge of the hole and is depressed against the strike plate when the door is closed. When the deadlatch is depressed, the latch cannot be pushed back from the outside.

When an electric strike is installed on a door, the electric strike takes the place of the regular strike plate. Electric strikes have a much larger opening or “cavity” than a regular strike plate does. The larger cavity allows the electric strike to work with a variety of different type of locksets and provides a little “wiggle room” to allow the electric strike to operate properly.

When a cylindrical lock is used with an electric strike, the latch enters into the cavity when the door is closed. But what about the deadlatch?

The electric strike is designed so that the deadlatch will rest upon the “lip” or “keeper” that is at the front of the electric strike. Unfortunately, the keeper of the electric strike is usually only about an 1/8″ wide. This makes the alignment of the electric strike in relationship to the deadlatch very critical. If the electric strike is not perfectly aligned, the deadlatch will fall into the cavity rather than resting upon the keeper as it is supposed to. This prevents the deadlatch from operating correctly, and allows the latch to be easily pushed back using a knife or credit card. The result: a door that can be very easily opened by an intruder.

When Silva Consultants conducts a security assessment, we find that the deadlatch fails to work properly on as many as 6 out of 10 doors that we examine!

Most electric strike manufacturers recognize that the deadlatching function will not work properly when their electric strikes are used with cylindrical locks. Many manufacturers specifically state in their literature that proper operation of the deadlatch cannot be guaranteed.

In most cases, card readers and electric strikes are used on doors that allow access into high security areas. It is ironic that, in most cases, doors equipped with cylindrical locks and electric strikes are easier to force open than doors with regular manual locks.

What can the security system user do to correct this weakness? Here are a few suggestions:

  • Examine all doors that have cylindrical locks and electric strikes to determine if the deadlatching function is working properly. Look to see if the deadlatch rests upon the keeper as it is supposed to. If the deadlatch goes into the strike cavity instead of resting on the keeper, the deadlatching function isn’t working properly.
  • If the deadlatch appears to be resting on the keeper, give the door a good hard push and pull. In many cases, this will cause the deadlatch to come off of the keeper and fall into the strike cavity. If this happens, the deadlatch can be easily defeated by an intruder.
  • If the deadlatching function isn’t working properly, or can be easily defeated by pushing or pulling on the door, the first thing to do is to call in a qualified electric hardware installer to examine the door. In many cases, the electric strike or door can be adjusted so that the deadlatch operate correctly.
  • On outswinging doors, consider the installation of a “latchguard”. The latchguard is a metal plate that installs on the outside of the door and protects the latch from tampering. Latchguards cost less than $50 and can be installed by a qualified locksmith.
  • For high security doors, consider replacing the cylindrical lock with a mortise lock. The deadlatch provided on a mortise lock rests either above or below the electric strike cavity when the door is closed. A mortise lock, when used with a properly installed electric strike, is immune to the deadlatching problem and provides much better security than a cylindrical lock.
  • For very high security doors, consider using an electric mortise lock instead of an electric strike. Electric mortise locks provide excellent security, and in our opinion, are the best choice for use on high security doors. When building a new facility, or planning an new card access system, consider the use of electric mortise locks wherever possible. The cost of installing electric mortise locks is only slightly higher than the cost of installing electric strikes when the hardware is provided as part of a new construction project.