Warehouses and distribution centers are frequent targets of burglary, theft and pilferage. These facilities contain lots of new merchandise in its original packaging, something that is highly-desirable to both professional and amateur thieves.

The large quantity of merchandise in most warehouses also brings out an emotional feeling within many people that suggests: “Wow, there are so many of these items, they won’t miss just one…”. This feeling can sometimes tempt people who otherwise wouldn’t think of themselves as criminals.

Warehouses are subject to both internal and external theft. Internal thefts are committed by company employees, contractors, and other “insiders” who have a legitimate reason to be in the warehouse at certain times. External thefts are committed by “outsiders”- people outside of the company who have no legitimate need to be in the warehouse and are coming to the facility specifically to steal.

Truck drivers and other types of delivery service drivers can pose a specific security risk. Some drivers have gotten into the habit of stealing from their customers when making a pick-up or delivery, and consider this to be a justifiable “fringe benefit” given the inadequate wages that they feel they are making. Drivers are often allowed to wander freely while their trailer is being loaded or unloaded and can use this opportunity to gather up items that they wish to steal. It is often easy to place additional items into the trailer after it has been loaded, or to place stolen items into the cab of the truck unnoticed.

Along the same lines, many warehouse employees feel that they are underpaid and underappreciated, and look at stealing from the warehouse as a way to supplement their income and to get back at their employer at the same time. There are variety of ways in which warehouse employees can steal: some simply load merchandise into their car during the day; others place merchandise in trash bins and come back later to retrieve it; and still others may pack merchandise into a box and ship it to themselves using a bogus address that they have established just for this purpose.

Sometimes, dishonest warehouse employees work in conjunction with dishonest truck drivers to steal from the company. This can be a particularly dangerous combination: the warehouse employee has knowledge of what’s coming and going, can plant stolen merchandise in outgoing shipments, and can modify paperwork to cover his tracks – while the truck driver has the means to remove the merchandise from the warehouse. Collusion between warehouse employees and truck drivers is a big problem in some industries and is responsible for multiple millions of dollars of losses each year.

Here are a few suggestions for providing good security at warehouses and distribution centers:

• Try to separate areas used for Shipping away from areas used for Receiving. When possible, provide physical barriers between these two areas.
• Where possible, provide a separately fenced yard area that encloses the warehouse shipping and receiving doors. Establish a policy that prohibits personal vehicles from being driven into the shipping and receiving yard area. Keep the gate to the exterior yard area locked at times when the warehouse is closed.
• Do not allow employee or visitor parking near warehouse shipping and receiving doors.
• Do not allow truck drivers to wander through your warehouse. If possible, provide dedicated “driver lounge” for use by drivers. Driver lounge should contain restrooms and other amenities that can be used by drivers while they are waiting for their trailers to be loaded or unloaded. Access to driver lounge should not require travel through interior warehouse areas.
• Exterior trash and recycle containers should not be directly accessible from the inside of the warehouse. If possible, locate exterior trash and recycle containers away from building. Keep trash and recycle containers locked. Establish procedures for trash removal that requires at least two employees to be present when trash is being removed from the building.
• When possible, the warehouse manager’s office should be located so that direct visual observation of the shipping and receiving bay doors from the office is possible.
• Avoid stacking merchandise directly in front of shipping and receiving doors – try to maintain a “clear-zone of at least ten feet.
• Don’t leave valuables sitting unattended on exterior loading docks or platforms.
• Provide separate areas for the storage of valuable or highly desirable items, such as computer and electronic equipment, cigarettes, liquor, baby formula, expensive clothing, etc. If possible. create separately lockable “high-value” cages or rooms for the storage of these items.
• Use an electronic access control system to control access into high-value rooms or cages. Access control system should be capable of providing audit trail of who entered and when.
• Provide video surveillance system to record activity in high value cages and rooms. Cameras should be placed to view entrance points as well as interior areas.
• Consider instituting policy where at least two employees must be present in order to enter a high-value cage or room (“two-man rule”).
• In locations where overhead doors must be left open for ventilation purposes, provide folding metal security gates to protect the door opening when the door is left open. Consider the use of an electronic door monitoring system that sounds an alert when both the overhead door and the folding gate have been left open for longer than a specified time period.
• Strictly limit the number of exterior doors that can be used for employee entrance and exit. Avoid having entrance doors where they cannot be observed by staff. Provide audible exit alarms on all doors designated as emergency exit only doors. Consider the use of delayed-egress devices on emergency exit doors that are being frequently misused.
• Establish procedures to control outgoing shipments to prevent employees from making unauthorized shipments to themselves.
• Avoid situations where trailers filled with merchandise are stored in your warehouse yard at times when the warehouse is closed. If trailers containing merchandise must be stored outside, consider installing an intrusion alarm system to protect the exterior yard area and/or the trailers themselves.
• Large warehouses and distribution centers should have manned security checkpoints at the entrances to the site. All outbound trucks should be required to stop at the checkpoint for inspection prior to leaving the site. At smaller warehouses where a manned checkpoint cannot be justified, consider having a supervisor or security officer make unannounced checks of outbound vehicles on a random basis.

Many governmental agencies require that commercial businesses install key boxes on the exterior of their buildings to allow fire department access. These boxes are typically installed at primary building entrances and contain things such as master keys, access cards, and building floor plans. One major manufacturer of fire department key boxes is the Knox Company, so these key boxes are often called “Knox Boxes”, even though several other manufacturers produce similar types of products.

Fire department key boxes are usually purchased and installed by the building owner, but come without the exterior lock. After the box has been installed, the owner arranges an appointment with the fire department, who comes out to the site and installs the exterior lock. At this time, the owner places building master keys, access cards, and floor plans into the box. Once the box has been locked by the fire department, the owner no longer has access, and it can only be accessed by the fire department.

All key boxes in a particular fire district zone are keyed alike. All fire department vehicles who respond to this zone carry a key that unlocks all of the key boxes in their zone. In a smaller city or town, there may be only one zone, so one key can unlock everything; in larger cities, there may be many different zones and many different keys.

The fire department key box is typically used when the building is closed and no one is around to let the fire department into the premises. The first responding emergency vehicle uses the fire department key to unlock the key box, and then removes the master keys and access cards from inside the box. These keys and cards are used by fire department personnel to gain entry to the premises, and to get inside of any locked rooms on the inside of the building.

Fire department key boxes are a weak spot in the building’s overall security program because anyone who has access to the key box has access to every area of the building. An intruder who compromises the key box literally has the “keys to the castle” and can go almost anywhere that he wants.

There are two primary ways in which the fire department key box can be compromised. The first way is for the fire department’s key to fall into the wrong hands. This could occur if the fire department key was lost or stolen from a fire department vehicle. This would give the person who took the key access to all buildings within the local fire zone (possibly hundreds of different businesses). Preventing this type of event from occurring is completely outside of the control of the property owner. One would hope that the fire department takes adequate precautions to keep fire department keys safe, and would quickly rekey the key box locks throughout the fire zone if a key to this zone was lost or stolen.

The second way for the fire department key box to be compromised is for it to be physically attacked. Most key boxes are well-constructed and designed to resist attack, but are not impenetrable. An intruder who has the proper tools and ample time can eventually compromise the key box. Some intruders actually remove the key box from the wall, and then take it to another location where they have more time to break-in to the box without being seen. They then return to the building to burglarize it once they have the master keys that were in the key box.

The most dangerous type of situation is where the intruder breaks-in to the key box surreptitiously without leaving any physical signs that the box has been tampered with. This can allow the intruder to steal keys and access cards and use them to make repeated entries into the premises over an extended period of time without being noticed. A creative intruder could even steal the original key box and replace it with a substitute key box to avoid the theft being noticed.

Here are some tips for providing improved security of your fire department key box:

• When possible, arrange to have the fire department key box installed in a well-lit location that is visible from the street. Avoid having the fire department key box installed in hidden or out-of-the way places.
• Recess-mounted key boxes are considerably more attack-resistant than surface mounted key boxes and should be used whenever possible. If you don’t currently have a good place to install a recess-mounted box, consider constructing a concrete or masonry pillar next to the entrance just to hold the key box. An existing wall can also be faced with masonry veneer to provide a place where a recess-mounted box can be installed.
• If the key box must be surface mounted, make sure that it is rigidly attached to a structural support member and not fastened to just the wallboard or siding.
• Provide an alarm tamper switch within the fire department key box. Connect this switch to your intrusion alarm system or security management system. This system should be programmed to notify an off-site alarm monitoring station or on-site security officers anytime that the box has been opened.
• If your facility has a video surveillance system, provide a camera that views the area where the fire department key box is located.
• If you use a security guard or patrol service, have the security officer regularly check the fire department key box as a part of his nightly rounds.

Purpose

Security window film is used to enhance the security of regular window glass. When properly applied, security window can provide the following benefits:

• Security window film can increase the strength of the window, which can delay or prevent entry by a burglar.
• Security window film can reduce injuries caused by flying glass when the window is shattered. This could occur because of an accident, an act of vandalism, a bomb blast, or a natural disaster.
• Certain types of security window film can provide benefits not directly related to security. These can include tinting of the window, reduction of the heat passing through the glass, and the reduction of damages caused by the sun’s ultraviolet rays.

Types of Security Window Film

Security window film consists of one or more layers of polyester film, laminated together with special adhesives. Security window film typically ranges in thickness from 4 mils (100 micron) to 14 mils (350 micron) or more. Thicker films are usually constructed by laminating multiple layers of thinner film together. Different types of films and adhesives are used depending on the characteristics desired in the finished product. Security window film is packaged in rolls of varying widths, the most common being 36″, 48″, 60″, and 72″. The length of film on a roll usually varies between 50 and 100 feet. 

In general, the thicker the film is, the stronger it is. As the thickness of the film increases, the degree of break strength, tear strength, and puncture strength also increases. Thicker film usually costs more due to the greater amount of materials needed and the additional manufacturing time required.

For most security applications, 8 mil to 14 mil thickness film is commonly used. Thinner films are often used in lower threat environments or when the primary reason for installing the film is for tinting or solar protection. Thicker films are often used in higher threat environments where additional security protection is needed.  

Installation of Security Window Film

Security window film is most commonly installed on a retrofit basis on the inside of existing windows. The installation is done at the job site, and involves the cutting and applying of the film to the surface of the glass of each window. The film is attached using a special adhesive and must be carefully installed to eliminate creases and air bubbles. Correctly installing security window film requires a high degree of skill and is generally done by professional installers.

The most widely used method of installing window film on existing windows is known as the “daylight” method, where the film is applied leaving a slight gap between the edge of the film and the edge of the window frame. The daylight installation method provides a reasonable degree of protection against forced entry and flying glass and is considered adequate for most facilities. However, many security experts feel that the daylight method does not provide an adequate amount of protection against the forces generated by a bomb blast or an attack by a particularly aggressive intruder. 

When an increased degree of protection is required, a different type of installation method, known as the “anchored” method, should be used instead of the daylight method. There are two types of anchored installation methods, the “mechanical” method, and the “wet” method.

The mechanical method involves the physical attachment of the window film to the window frame. Using this method, the window film is applied to the glass, but instead of being cut near the edge of the glass, it is overlapped over the window frame, and mechanically attached to the frame itself. The film can be attached to the frame using metal batten strips, or by using one of several devices designed specifically for the purpose. Depending on the degree of strength desired, the film can be attached on one, two, or all four sides of the window pane.

The wet method involves the attachment of the window film to the window frame with an adhesive sealant. Using this method, the window film is applied to the glass using the daylight method, but a little less gap is left between the film and the edge of the frame. A bead of special adhesive sealant is then applied around all four edges of the film, creating a tight bond between the film and the window frame. The use of adhesive sealant can have a negative impact on the appearance of the window, particularly if poorly installed. To solve this problem, there are products manufactured that can be installed along the edge of the glass to conceal the sealant and create a finished appearance.

Tempered glass windows shatter into tiny cubes when broken, making the use of the daylight installation method ineffective on these windows. Either a mechanical or wet anchored installation method should be used on tempered glass windows.

 Anti-Graffiti Window Film

There is a special type of window film designed specifically to prevent damage caused by graffiti. This film is installed on the exterior of the glass (unlike security film, which is installed on the inside) and is designed to absorb damage caused by painting, etching, and other types of “tagging”. This film is sometimes called “sacrificial film”, because it is intended to be removed and replaced after a tagging attack. The cost of replacing film is much less than the cost of replacing the glass, making it economical for use in locations where graffiti on windows is an ongoing problem. 

It is important to note that anti-graffiti film does not provide any significant protection against intrusion or bomb blast, so there may be cases where both types of film may be needed on the same window (anti-graffiti film on the outside, security film on the inside.)

Suggestions for Using Security Window Film

1. The decision to use or not use security window film should only be made after a comprehensive security assessment has been conducted. The security assessment should provide guidance as to where security window film should be used, and establish the type of security film and attachment methods to be used based upon the level of risk at the specific facility.
2. The use of security window film to mitigate the effects of bomb blast is a complicated matter. If your primary reason for installing window film is to reduce injuries caused by bomb blast, a detailed blast analysis should first be conducted by a qualified bomb blast consultant. This consultant can help to specify the type of window film that should be used and the recommended attachment method. This consultant may also specify supplementary “catchment” systems that catch the glass when it is blown out of the frame, greatly increasing the degree of blast protection.
3. Choose a reputable local installation contractor to install your security window film. Obtain and check references, and ask to visit other facilities in the local area where the same type of product as you are considering has already been installed. If possible, visit installations that are at least several years old so you can see how the film looks after it has aged.
4. Any type of anchored security window film installation is only as strong as the window frame itself. In some cases, reinforcement or replacement of the window frames may be required in order to provide the desired level of protection.
5. In some cases, windows may already have tinted or solar window films installed upon them. These films typically do not provide any significant protection against intrusion or bomb blast and may need to be removed from the windows prior to the installation of security window film.
6. Security window film is not bullet-resistant. If your facility requires protection against bullets, consider the use of bullet-resistant glass and other materials. (See Security Tip #3-10: Introduction to Bullet-Resistant Materials)
7. Many intrusion alarm (burglar alarm) systems make use of glass breakage sensors to detect when a window has been broken. These can include sensors that mount on the glass itself, as well as acoustical sensors that are mounted to the walls or ceilings and listen for the sounds of breaking glass. The use of security window film may reduce the effectiveness of these sensors – be sure to notify your alarm company prior to installing window film and test all sensors for proper operation after the film has been installed.

Confidential information is often stored in desks or file cabinets. This confidential information can include personnel records, marketing plans, research and development plans, secret formulas and other types of sensitive information. In some cases, people also store cash, negotiable securities and other high value assets in desks or file cabinets.

Many people think that their assets are safe if they are stored in a locking desk drawer or locking cabinet. This is far from the truth.

Most of the locks typically used on desks and file cabinets are simple locks that can be compromised in a number of ways.

First, most locks used on desks and file cabinets use a standard “factory” lock provided by the furniture manufacturer. In many cases, the manufacturer provides only a small number of different key combinations. Some manufacturers provide as few as twenty different keys. This means that it is highly probable that the key to your desk also fits hundreds of other desks produced by the same manufacturer. This also means that it is highly probable that hundreds of other people have a key that fits your desk!

This can be a particular problem in large companies that have standardized on a particular brand of furniture. In these companies, it is very likely that many desks and file cabinets will be keyed alike. This usually means that one employee’s desk key will probably work on dozens of other desks and file cabinets throughout the organization.

The second weakness of standard factory locks on desks and file cabinets is that they usually have a key number printed on them. This is usually a three or four digit code that is stamped on the face of the lock. This number tells which key fits the lock, and allows a duplicate key to be ordered from the furniture manufacturer or from any locksmith.

A person who wanted to gain access to your desk or file cabinet could simply look at your lock and get the key number. He could then look around the company to see if he could find a key with a matching number. If unsuccessful, he could simply go to the corner locksmith and order a key. This person would now have access to your desk or file cabinet anytime he wanted, and you would be none the wiser.

Finally, most standard factory locks used on desks and file cabinets are easily “picked” open. Anyone with a set of lock picks or even a paperclip can usually open these locks in very little time. Unlike door locks, which usually require some level of skill to “pick”, desk and file cabinet locks can usually be opened by almost anyone.

The conclusion: standard desk and file cabinet locks provide almost no security. They should not be used to store high value assets or confidential information.

Suggestions

• File cabinets that are used to store low-to-medium value assets should be equipped with locking “slidebars”. These slidebars mount on the exterior of the file cabinet and are locked using a padlock. When locked, the slidebars prevent the file drawers from being opened. High-security padlocks (such as the Medeco) should be used with the slidebars instead of regular padlocks. Slidebars and high-security padlocks are available from most of the larger locksmithing companies.
• High value assets should be stored in a burglary-rated file cabinet or burglary-rated safe. “Burglary-rated” means that the file cabinet or safe has been designed to resist break-ins and has been tested by an independent testing laboratory (most often UL). Burglary-rated file cabinets and safes should be purchased from a reputable safe and vault company.
• Fire-rated file cabinets and safes are designed to resist fire, not to resist break-in! Many fire-rated file cabinets and safes use the same type of “factory lock” described above and provide very little security. Look at the UL label on your file cabinet or safe to determine how it is rated. If unsure, consult a safe and vault specialist.
• Remove the key number from your desk and file cabinet locks. This number can usually be removed easily using sandpaper or a small metal file. (Be sure to write down the number on the inside of the drawer for future reference.)